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This dissertation thesis analyzes different aspects of the 2008-2013 debt crisis 
in the European Monetary Union (EMU): a) the sovereign debt market in the EMU 
before the crisis and, b) the spillover effects of the crisis on the real sector around the 
world. 
Chapter 1 provides an overview of the recent history of the EMU and 
highlights the contribution of this thesis to the literature. 
Chapter 2 studies the behavior of sovereign spreads of EMU countries and 
their apparent disconnection with country-specific fundamentals before the Eurozone 
debt crisis. We test three characteristics of spreads: i) a lower level of spreads, ii) a 
weak link between spreads and macroeconomic fundamentals, and iii) a reduction in 
the cross-country variance of spreads. We find that, in comparison to economies from 
other regions, spreads from EMU members are lower, the relationship of spreads with 
variables like fiscal balance, GDP growth rate, and public debt is weaker, and their 
  
cross-country variance is statistically lower than the cross-country variance of spreads 
from non-EMU countries between 1999 and end-2005. Without excluding alternative 
explanations for the behavior of pre-crisis sovereign spreads, these results are 
consistent with the existence of creditor moral hazard in the EMU's sovereign bond 
market before the crisis. 
Chapter 3 is coauthored with Dr. Stijn Claessens and Dr. Hui Tong. We 
analyze through what channels the EMU crisis has affected firm valuations and what 
the efficacy of various policy interventions to mitigate the crisis has been. We do so 
using stock price responses for 3045 non-financial firms in 16 countries to policy 
measures announced at four key events in 2010 and 2011. Using pre-crisis 
benchmarks, we separate effects arising from changes in financing conditions from 
trade effects and examines if bank or trade linkages propagated shocks across 
borders. We find that measures impacted financially-constrained firms more, 
particularly in creditor countries with greater bank exposure to peripheral Euro 
countries. Trade linkages with peripheral countries played a minor role, although 
Euro exchange rate movements led to some differential effects. This study concludes 
that interventions were mostly geared towards preserving creditor banks’ ability to 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
In 1999, 11 countries of the European Union (Austria, Belgium, Finland, 
France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain) 
embraced further economic and financial integration and established the European 
Monetary Union (EMU or Eurozone). The main expectations of this newly created 
single-currency area were to a) make the European Union’s single market more 
efficient, b) facilitate international trade of goods, services, and financial assets, c) 
increase transparency in the price setting process, and d) reduce the vulnerability of 
Eurozone countries to external economic shocks. Since then, the Eurozone has grown 
to 17 members, with Greece, Slovenia, Cyprus, Malta, Slovakia, and Estonia joining 
at later stages.  
For almost a decade, the EMU was considered a symbol for successful market 
integration without major macroeconomic, financial, external or sectorial shocks. In 
2008 the situation changed and since then the EMU has lived through the most 
complex period in its history. Between 2008 and 2013, the Eurozone has faced both 
financial and public debt crises that have led to the exclusion of several EMU 
countries from the international capital markets or have forced them to pay high 
premia to borrow from those markets. As a consequence, countries like Greece, 
Ireland, Portugal, and Cyprus, and the banking sector of Spain have requested 
financial assistance from the European Commission, the European Central Bank 
(ECB), and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Furthermore, the group of 
countries referred by the financial press as "Peripheral Euro Countries" (PEC) - 




order to consolidate their public accounts and to maintain the stability of their 
economies. 
Overall, this ongoing crisis period has led to difficult economic and social 
circumstances for most of the EMU area: at the end of 2012, Eurozone countries have 
reached average levels of public deficit and debt of 3.7% and 90.6% of GDP, 
respectively. At the same time, output growth of the region has been anemic, with -
1% growth for the same year. Moreover, the EMU unemployment rate has reached 
12.2% in May 2013, with the most critical situations taking place in Greece and 
Spain, struggling with unemployment rates of 26.8% and 26.9%, respectively. 
The European Monetary Union is considered the most interesting experiment 
of financial and economic integration in history. The introduction of a single 
currency, a common central bank, and the process of legal harmonization, among 
other policies, have made the Eurozone one of the most financially integrated regions 
in the world (measured by different de jure and de facto indicators). Before the start 
of the EMU crisis, most of the literature studying that region focused on the benefits 
of this integration process, particularly highlighting the role that the elimination of the 
currency risk, the reduction of transaction costs, and the increment of liquidity in 
financial markets played on the behavior of the financial assets' prices, the cross-
border capital flows, and the intraregional trade. Yet, the crisis has unveiled several 
weaknesses of the EMU integration process and has become an opportunity to better 
understand other dimensions of financial integration, such as its economic costs, its 




border spillover of shocks in integrated economies, the institutional structure needed 
to deal with shocks under financial integration, among others. 
The purpose of this dissertation thesis is to contribute to these newly arising 
research questions by analyzing key aspects of the EMU crisis. In particular, we study 
the effect of EMU's currency area on its member countries' sovereign bond market 
(Chapter 2), and analyze the transmission channels for the worldwide spillover of the 
EMU crisis (Chapter 3). Although this document cannot cover all topics related to the 
crisis (since it is complex and still unfolding), we consider that the aspects studied 
here are important in order to understand the causes and dynamics of the crisis. 
Furthermore, our findings give novel insights to mechanisms that are working in 
integrated economies during periods of economic distress. We believe that this newly 
gained understanding is relevant for designing institutions and policies that help 
minimize the undesired effects of adverse shocks in the future. 
The remainder of this dissertation thesis is divided in two parts: Chapter 2, 
titled "Sovereign Spreads in the Eurozone: Is Market Discipline Working?", studies 
the behavior of sovereign spreads of EMU countries and their apparent disconnection 
with country-specific fundamentals before the EMU debt crisis. Since 1999 until the 
start of the crisis in 2008, sovereign spreads of Eurozone countries were low and 
close together, and not highly responsive to member countries' macroeconomic 
fundamentals. The elimination of currency risk due to the introduction of the Euro, 
the reduction of transaction costs for trading financial assets due to the process of 
legal harmonization among Eurozone members, and the constitution of a larger (more 




the main hypotheses suggested by the literature to explain the behavior of pre-crisis 
sovereign spreads. Without excluding those possible explanations, this chapter 
explores whether the behavior of pre-crisis spreads could also be related to the 
existence of creditors' expectations of bailouts in case of an economic crisis scenario. 
In particular, we test whether pre-crisis spreads exhibit three features that the 
literature has associated with the existence of those expectations: i) a lower spread 
level, ii) a weak relationship with macroeconomic fundamentals, and iii) a lower 
cross-sectional variance among bond spreads from different economies. 
Using information of 31 countries (10 of them from the EMU area) and 
monthly data from January 1996 until March 2008, Chapter 2 finds that: First, pre-
crisis sovereign spreads of EMU countries are, on average, lower in comparison with 
spreads of non-EMU countries. Second, spreads of EMU countries have a weaker 
relationship with macroeconomic fundamentals such as fiscal balance, public debt, 
and GDP growth rate. In particular, spreads are less sensitive to larger levels of public 
debt when the country is an EMU member. Third, the cross-country variance of EMU 
spreads is statistically lower than the variance of non-EMU spreads between 1999 and 
end-2005. These results are valid after controlling for country fundamental indicators 
and global market conditions, and remain robust also after controlling for indicators 
capturing currency risk, liquidity (size) of the bond market, financial integration 
indicators, and the general demand for financial assets from those countries (an 
"exuberance" effect). In conclusion, without excluding other hypotheses suggested by 




chapter are consistent with the existence of creditor moral hazard in the EMU's 
sovereign bond market before the crisis. 
Chapter 3, titled "Saving the Euro: Mitigating Financial or Trade Channels?", 
was written with Dr. Stijn Claessens and Dr. Hui Tong from the Research Department 
of the International Monetary Fund. This chapter studies how the EMU crisis affected 
global corporate valuation, particularly for EU firms, and how policy interventions 
may have mitigated (or not) international spillovers of the crisis. Using information 
for 3045 non-financial firms from 16 countries, we classify those firms based on pre-
crisis benchmark indicators regarding their dependence on external finance, and 
financial and trade linkages with the group of peripheral Euro countries (PEC). Later, 
we evaluate how those indicators can explain the reaction of stock returns of those 
firms for four key events of the EMU crisis between 2010 and 2011: i) the 
establishment of the € 750 billion bailout fund for countries in crisis (May 10, 2010); 
ii) the public disagreement among EMU economic authorities on private sector 
participation in the first bailout for Greece (June 8-10, 2011); iii) the announcement 
of the second bailout for Greece (July 19-21, 2011); and iv) the announcement of new 
terms for the second bailout for Greece (October 25-27, 2011). 
We identify the financial and trade channels to be the main transmission 
channels for spillovers of the EMU crisis around the world. In particular, we find that 
the crisis had a larger impact on firms with greater ex-ante financial constraints (i.e., a 
larger indicator of dependence on external finance), and especially so in creditor 
countries more financially exposed to peripheral Euro countries through bank claims. 




demand for exports, with differential effects across exporting firms in Euro vs. non-
Euro areas, possibly because of the effects of Euro exchange rate changes vis-à-vis 
third (non-Euro) countries. 
The main conclusion of Chapter 3 is that EMU policy makers did take into 
account potential effects on both the soundness of their local banks as well trade with 
PEC when they planned (or reverted course on) various support measures. Also, from 
the perspective of saving the Euro, it appears most important (under the eyes of 
financial markets) to address spillovers through cross-border banking exposures. 
Overall, the results of this dissertation thesis shed light on the mechanics of 
different economic phenomena that arise in integrated economies during periods of 
economic distress. Therefore, the findings presented in this document add valuable 
information to the debate on which elements should be taken into account in the 




















The 2008-2013 debt crisis in the European Monetary Union (EMU) has given 
rise to two phenomena in the European sovereign bond market that had not been 
observed since the currency area's establishment. First, an unprecedented increase in 
the EMU member countries' sovereign bond spreads and, second, a widening of 
spreads among EMU members. In fact, while the pre-crisis spreads between 1999 and 
2008 were on average 17.7 basis points (bps) with a cross-country standard deviation 
of 16.2 bps, the average spreads between September 2008 and October 2012 were 
289 bps (191 bps if Greece is excluded) with a cross-country standard deviation of 
327 bps for the same period (168 bps if Greece is excluded). Hence, the spreads 
during crisis are more than 15 times higher compared to pre-crisis conditions and 
have been most pronounced in countries like Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and 
Spain. As a consequence, these countries have been affected in their ability to borrow 
from international markets and have been forced to request loans from the European 
Union and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) (Figure 1). 








Figure 1: Sovereign Bond Spreads of selected EMU countries 
     
Note: Spreads of 10-year sovereign bonds over German bonds. 
Source: Bloomberg. Author’s calculations.  
 
 
In addition to the fact that the recent behavior of EMU's sovereign spreads 
sharply contrasts with their performance before the crisis in size and cross-country 
variability, there is evidence in the literature that pre-crisis spreads were not highly 
responsive to member countries' macroeconomic fundamentals. Sgherri and Zoli 
(2009), Attinasi et al. (2009), and Bernoth et al. (2012) documented that, before the 
crisis, global indicators of risk repricing and global liquidity (i.e., international 
interest rates) were the main drivers of EMU spreads, whereas fiscal and national 
macroeconomic indicators became important in explaining the increase and 
differentials in spreads only in recent years. The latter result has been interpreted as 
"the return of market discipline" in the European bond market (Sgherri and Zoli, 




spreads were low and close together. First, the elimination of currency risk due to the 
introduction of the Euro has, in general, facilitated the integration of EMU financial 
markets, which is reflected in prices of financial assets (Fratzscher, 2002); second, the 
financial liberalization (i.e., legal harmonization) has reduced barriers and transaction 
costs to trade with assets from different countries, producing a price convergence of 
sovereign bonds and making spreads' behavior depend more on supranational policies 
(i.e., a common monetary policy) and global conditions than on individual countries' 
performances (Attinasi et al., 2009; Lane, 2006; Kaminsky and Schmukler, 2003); 
third, the access to a larger (and more liquid) financial market has reduced borrowing 
costs particularly for countries with a previously small capital market size (Gomez-
Puig, 2006). Although these hypotheses have analyzed the pre-crisis spreads' 
convergence observed in Figure 1, they have not been able to explain why spreads did 




In this area, a growing literature has emerged which shows that investors' 
(creditors') bailout expectations have effects on the valuation of financial assets and 
of sovereign bonds, in particular. According to these studies - under creditors' 
expectations of bailout - spreads of sovereign (or sub-national) debt tend to have the 
following characteristics: i) lower levels (i.e., lower risk premia), ii) a weak 
relationship with national (or sub-national) macroeconomic fundamentals, and iii) a 
                                                 
1
 For instance, the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) established limits to the levels of public debt and 
fiscal deficits of 60% and 3% of GDP, respectively, in order ensure the macroeconomic stability of the 
EMU currency area. However, countries like Greece and Italy have shown historical levels of public 
debt above 100% of GDP, while countries like France, Germany, and Portugal exhibited debt levels 
above 60% of GDP since 2003-2005. In addition, the fiscal deficits of Greece, Portugal, and Italy were 





lower cross-sectional variance among bond spreads of national (or sub-national) 
economies. Empirical evidence supporting these features has been found in the case 
of the IMF's interventions in emerging economies during the financial crises in the 
1990s as well as in partially segmented markets and in (national) currency areas (see 
below). 
The purpose of this chapter is to test whether pre-crisis sovereign bonds of 
EMU member countries exhibit the above characteristics. Specifically, we want to 
evaluate whether sovereign bond spreads of EMU countries tend to be lower, their 
relationship with macroeconomic fundamentals is weaker, and their cross-country 
variance tends to be lower in comparison to spreads' variance of countries that are not 
part of the EMU area. Economic theory suggests that, when creditors have the 
expectation that a country will receive a bailout package in the scenario of financial 
distress, they perceive that their losses in case of a country's default are reduced and, 
therefore, request a lower credit risk premium to invest in those bonds. Moreover, 
since country monitoring is a costly process, when creditors expect lower losses due 
to their perception of a future bailout, they are more likely to engage in reckless 
investment behaviors such as paying less attention to macroeconomic fundamentals 
when pricing bonds or investing in bonds from countries with weak economic 
positions. Consequently, we expect sovereign spreads to respond less to changes in 
macroeconomic indicators in comparison to the scenario when bailout expectations 
do not exist. Finally, under expectations of a future bailout, investors tend to invest in 
bonds with intrinsic higher risk (based on macroeconomic fundamentals). Under 




bonds with lower risk, which is reflected in a faster reduction of spreads. Therefore, 
we anticipate that the cross-country variance of spreads will be lower under bailout 
expectations. 
Using the methodologies of panel data with random effects, mixed models 
panel data, and the difference-in-difference approach, we analyze the relationship of 
pre-crisis spreads with countries' indicators of fiscal position (i.e., public debt and 
public balance), economic growth (i.e., GDP growth rate), external solvency (i.e., 
international reserves), and macroeconomic instability (i.e., inflation rate) , among 
others. Also, we include in our analysis global conditions such as investors' risk 
appetite (i.e., VIX index) and global liquidity (i.e., US FED policy rate). Finally, we 
include variables that capture the aforementioned explanations suggested by the 
literature for the behavior of pre-crisis spreads in EMU countries, such as the de facto 
exchange rate regime (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2004), the outstanding amount of 
international debt securities issued by governments, the de facto financial integration 
indicator, and the growth rate of the stock market. We use monthly information 
between January 1996 and March 2008. 
Our results show that, in comparison to economies from other regions, 
member countries of the EMU area have, on average, lower spreads. In addition, we 
find that the relationship of those spreads with macroeconomic fundamentals such as 
fiscal balance and the GDP growth rate is weaker, and that spreads are less sensitive 
to larger levels of public debt when the country is an EMU member. Finally, we find 
evidence that the cross-country variance of EMU spreads is statistically lower than 




when controlling for country fundamental indicators and global market conditions, 
and are robust even after controlling for other indicators that capture alternative 
explanations of the sovereign spreads' behavior, such as currency risk, liquidity (size) 
of the bond market, financial integration, and the general demand for financial assets 
from those countries (an "exuberance" effect). Overall, our results suggest that 
institutional arrangements like the EMU area have effects on investors' valuation of 
sovereign risk, and are consistent with the existence of creditor moral hazard in the 
EMU's sovereign bond market. 
This study has been influenced by two branches of literature: First, the 
literature on determinants of sovereign risk, which has mainly focused on 
distinguishing whether country-specific or international market-specific 
characteristics are the main determinants of the level and variability of debt spreads. 
On the one hand, papers like Akitoby and Stratmann (2006), Remolona, Scatigna and 
Wu (2007), and Baldacci, Gupta and Mati (2008) consider that the main drivers of 
sovereign debt spreads are country-specific characteristics such as debt indicators 
(i.e., government debt, external debt, currency composition of debt, etc.), 
macroeconomic indicators (i.e., inflation rate, current account balance, fiscal balance, 
output growth rate, etc.), and institutional indicators (i.e., rule of law, political risk, 
etc.). On the other hand, papers such as McGuire and Schrijvers (2003), Sgherri and 
Zoli (2009), and Gonzalez-Rozada and Levy Yeyati (2005) consider that international 
market-specific characteristics like market liquidity, investors' risk appetite, and 
global risk repricing are key determinants of movements of sovereign debt spreads. In 




al. (2003), Bernoth et al. (2004), Manganelli and Wolswijk (2009) and Sgherri and 
Zoli (2009) have found that the behavior of spreads in this area before the onset of the 
crisis were mainly associated with global market liquidity factors and global risk 
repricing (i.e., common international risk). 
Second, this study is also related to the literature on international moral 
hazard, which can be subdivided into two branches: the first branch comprises studies 
that focus on the effects of IMF interventions on spreads during the 1990s emerging 
economies' crises. This literature analyzes changes in the behavior of spreads and in 
their relationship with fundamentals before and after economic crises such as Mexico 
1994, East Asia 1997, Russia 1998, or Argentina 2001, moments in which the lenders' 
expectation of bailout changed with the IMF interventions. For instance, Dell'Ariccia 
et al. (2002, 2006) and Evrensel and Kutan (2004, 2006) find strong evidence for the 
existence of the moral hazard effect on both bond and stock markets before the onset 
of the Russian crisis. Lee and Shin (2008) conclude that expectations of IMF lending 
weaken the relationship between spreads and country fundamentals, with a higher 
incidence in countries with stronger connections to the IMF. Finally, Corsetti, 
Guimaraes and Roubini (2006) found that the moral hazard effect depends on the size 
of an IMF intervention and the quality of information that the IMF has.
2
 
The second branch of studies evaluates the existence of creditor moral hazard 
in segmented markets or in (national) currency areas. For instance, Bernal et al. 
(2010) find that, in partially segmented markets, fundamentals play a residual role to 
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explain bond pricing dynamics when creditors have expectations of bailout.
3
 
Consequently, they conclude that bailout expectations create creditors' moral hazard. 
Similarly, Heppke-Falk and Wolff (2008) and Schulz and Wolff (2008) provide 
evidence for the existence of creditor moral hazard in sub-national bond markets of 
German states. The first paper finds that, under expectations of bailout to Bremen and 
Saarland (materialized with the bailout's approval from the Federal Constitutional 
Court in 1992), lenders demand a lower rate of return to compensate for the default 
risk of these two regions. The second paper shows that, under expectations of bailout 
to Berlin, spreads of this sub-national government were less sensitive to changes in 
Berlin's fiscal fundamentals but, after the bailout's rejection in 2006, spreads partially 
increased and became more sensitive to debt indicators.
4
 
Relative to the existing literature, this paper stresses two important points. 
First, it shows that, in addition to country- and market-specific characteristics, and 
                                                 
3
 Bernal et al. (2010) analyze the case of holders of (repudiated) Russian bonds in British and French 
markets during the World War I. Given the protection that the French government had offered to 
bondholders in previous cases (i.e., repudiated Mexican bonds during the Mexican Revolution), the 
authors claim that creditors in the French market had expectations of bailout from their own 
government. That situation explains the different price dynamics that the same Russian bond had in the 
French market vs. the British market. 
4
 Henning and Kessler (2012) study the history of public debt of the US states and local governments. 
Although they do not analyze the spreads of US sub-national economies, they show that, between 1789 
and 1840s, it was common for the states to carry out unsustainable debt levels under the expectation of 
a federal bailout. That expectation had its precedent on the Alexander Hamilton's plan to make the 
federal government responsible for the states' debt after the independence war, and crystallized during 
states' default events of 1812 and 1836. However, in the 1840s the US Congress rejected the bailout of 
eight states and Florida (a US territory at that moment). The elements that allowed the Congress to 
reject this bailout request were: 1) the accumulated debt of the sub-national governments was to 
finance local projects, 2) since 70 percent of the sub-national debt bonds were in hands of British and 
Dutch investors, domestically held sub-national bonds were not a large part of the US banking 
portfolio (reducing a national spillover effect of states' default), 3) the number of financially sound 
states was larger than the number of states in distress, and 4) the domestic US capital market was deep 
enough to make the federal government less dependent of foreign loans. According to Henning and 
Kessler (2012), Wyplosz (2012), and Dove (2012) this event changed the incentives of US states for 
fiscal discipline: almost all states adopted balanced budget amendments to their constitutions or passed 
laws establishing it. Consequently, the authors claim that the Congress rejection created an implicit and 




without excluding other explanations (i.e., elimination of currency risk, larger 
financial liberalization, larger liquidity in the bond market, and the "exuberance" 
effect), institutional arrangements such as the EMU can have an important effect on 
the valuation of sovereign risk in international capital markets. Second, in contrast to 
most studies on the determinants of sovereign spreads that have been done for groups 
of countries or regions (i.e., developed economies, EMU countries or emerging 
economies), this paper undertakes a global analysis. This global perspective enables 
us to test for evidence of symptoms of moral hazard, using a natural experiment such 
as the European Monetary Union. 
We believe the results of this chapter to be relevant because they contribute to 
a better understanding of the dynamics of overborrowing, in particular how 
institutional arrangements affect borrowing costs in the international markets. In 
addition, our results add to the debate about which mechanisms should be created to 
deal with future sovereign debt distresses in EMU countries, with a particular focus 
on the means by which these mechanisms could generate international moral hazard 
and how to minimize it. 
This chapter is organized as follows: Section 2 explains why the EMU area 
could change investors' incentives to lend and to monitor EMU countries. Section 3 
establishes the theoretical framework, the econometric strategy, and describes the 
data we used for the empirical analysis. Section 4 presents the tests results and 





European Monetary Union and Investor Incentives 
Most of the studies on how institutional arrangements affect international 
investors' incentives to lend and/or to monitor borrower countries have focused on the 
effects of IMF interventions on the change of lenders' expectations about bailout. 
Specifically, they have focused on how spreads have changed after financial events 
such as the Mexican 1994, Asian 1997 or Russian 1998 crises.
5
 This association 
seems natural given that, under its role of preserving the stability of the global 
financial system, the IMF becomes a financial "safety net" for its member countries in 
case of economic distress. Therefore, an IMF intervention (or lack of intervention) 
and also the magnitude of the intervention should have effects on lenders' 
expectations regarding bailout. 
In case of the European Monetary Union, this relationship is more subtle. 
When the EMU area was constituted, the Maastricht Treaty of 1992 established a 
"non-bailout" clause in which EU institutions, the European Central Bank, and 
members of the EMU area had the prohibition to assume liabilities of other EMU 
members. In addition, under concerns that a monetary union without a fiscal 
unification could generate incentives for EMU members to generate large fiscal 
imbalances that could jeopardize the stability of the area, the Stability and Growth 
Pact (SGP) stipulated some convergence criteria to limit the members' fiscal 
accounts: i) a maximum fiscal deficit of 3% of GDP (for the general government), 
and ii) a maximum public debt level of 60% of GDP, among others. Consequently, 
one can say that, in terms of its legal structure, the EMU area could not be considered 
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 See Dell'Ariccia et al. (2006), Evrensel and Kutan (2004, 2006), Lee and Shin (2008), and Corsetti, 




a financial "safety net" for its member countries and, therefore, it should not affect 
lenders' incentives in the way that IMF interventions do. 
Nevertheless, the process of financial liberalization, legal harmonization, the 
introduction of a single currency and a common central bank - implemented after the 
signing of the Maastricht Treaty and the establishment of the EMU area - has made 
the EMU members some of the most financially integrated countries in the world. 
Figure 2 shows a comparative evolution of the cross-country average financial 
integration from 1980 to 2008 for seven regions using two different measures: de jure 
and de facto indicators.
6
  Figure 2A displays the de jure indicator - the Chinn and Ito 
(2006) index.
7
 There, we see that countries in the EMU area significatively reduced 
their restrictions to cross-border transactions after the signing of the Maastricht 
Treaty and, along with other developed economies (some of them part of the 
European Union), they are among the countries with the largest financial 
liberalization. Figure 2B shows the evolution of the de facto financial integration- 
based on information from Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007).
8
 The figure shows that 
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 The indicators are calculated as a cross-country simple average per region. The EMU region covers 
Austria, Belgium, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Finland, Greece, Ireland, Portugal, and Spain. EU 
Developed covers the United Kingdom, Denmark, and Sweden. EU Developing covers Bulgaria, 
Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland. Developed non-EU includes Canada and Norway. LAC 
includes: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, and Peru. Asia covers Malaysia, Philippines, 
and Thailand. Other Emerging includes Russia, Turkey, and South Africa. 
7
 The Chinn and Ito (2006) index is a measure of financial liberalization since it captures the 
restrictions on cross-border financial transactions reported in the IMF's Annual Report on Exchange 
Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions. 
    This index is calculated using four categories of information: 1) the presence of multiple exchange 
rates, 2) restrictions imposed on the current account transactions, 3) restrictions imposed on capital 
account transactions, and 4) the requirement to surrender exports proceeds. A large number of the 
index means that the country imposes fewer restrictions on external accounts. See details in Chinn and 
Ito (2006). 
8
 The de facto financial integration indicator captures the "intensity" of a country's financial integration 
with other countries (multilateral) because it computes the size of international assets and liabilities in 
proportion to its economy (GDP). 
    Since it has been observed that the world becomes more financially integrated over time, we 




the countries that later constituted the EMU area had, on average, a large level of 
financial integration during the 1980s in comparison to world's integration (where the 
world's integration is equal to 1). Moreover, after 1993 the EMU member countries 
showed a spectacular increase in integration and countries of that region became the 
most multilaterally integrated ones after 1999. 
 
Figure 2: Financial Integration Indicators 
Figure 2A: De Jure Indicator 
 
                                                                                                                                           
assets and liabilities around the world over the world's GDP. In other words, the measure of financial 
integration for country i shown in Figure 2B is given by: 
 
where FIit is the financial integration indicator for country i in period t, Ait is the total international 
financial assets of country i in period t, Lit is the total international financial liabilities of country i in 
period t, GDPit is the nominal GDP of country i in period t, n is the number of countries. 
    Information on international financial assets and liabilities were obtained from Lane and Milesi-





Figure 2B: De Facto Indicator 
Source: For De Jure indicator, Chinn and Ito (2006). For De Facto indicator, Lane and Milesi-Ferreti 
(2007). Author’s calculations. 
 
This process of financial integration has been particularly concentrated in the 
EMU area since the introduction of the Euro. Figure 3 displays the de facto financial 
integration indicators of several countries with member countries of the EMU area, 
North America (USA and Canada), and the European Union outside the EMU area, in 
1997 and 2008.
9
 One can see that in 1997 countries that later constituted the EMU 
zone did not have particularly strong financial links with other members of the EMU: 
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 For country i, the de facto financial integration indicator of country i with region K is calculated as: 
 
where i represents country i, j represents a country j that is member of region K, Aij,t is the total value 
of international assets of country i in country j for period t, Lij,t is the total value of international 
liabilities of country i with country j for period t, and GDPi,t is country i's GDP in period t. 
    This indicator is calculated using information from the IMF's Coordinated Portfolio Investment 
Survey (CPIS), which has annual data of bilateral assets and liabilities for years 1997, and between 




on average, future EMU countries showed a financial integration indicator with the 
EMU area, USA and Canada, and the EU but non-EMU area of 22.2%, 23.3%, and 
17% of GDP, respectively. However, by 2008, there had been a clear increase in 
financial links among EMU members in comparison to the other zones: for countries 
inside the EMU area, their financial integration indicator with countries of the same 
region rose to 119.5% of GDP on average, whereas integration with the USA and 
Canada, and with the EU non-EMU area were, on average, 33.2% and 41.8% of GDP, 
respectively. 
 
Figure 3: De facto Financial Integration with the EMU area, USA and Canada, 














Note: No available information for Germany, Greece, Russia, Brazil, and Mexico in 1997. 
Source: IMF-CPIS. Author’s calculations. 
 
 
As part of this process, financial linkages among EMU members have 
strengthened over time: the EMU members' financial systems have increased their 
EMU cross-border investments and, therefore, have raised their exposure to 
idiosyncratic shocks from other EMU countries. Figure 4A displays the total of banks' 
international claims (as percent of GDP) to EMU member countries in December 
1999 and in March 2008.
10
 We see a dramatic increment of the banking sector's 
exposure to other EMU members: while the average level of EMU banks' 
international claims to EMU countries was 19.6% of GDP in December 1999, this 
value more than doubled to 41.8% of GDP in March 2008. Countries such as 
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 Banks' international claims are defined as bank's cross-border claims plus local claims of foreign 
affiliates in foreign currencies. We use information of immediate borrower basis due to data 




Belgium, Ireland, and Netherlands even exhibited levels of bank exposure of over 
60% of GDP. 
 
Figure 4A: Bank Exposure to the EMU Area 
 
Note: Data for Germany is Foreign Claims (available data since March 2005). For France, data since 
June 2003. For Greece, data since December 2003. 
Source: BIS and IMF-WEO. Author’s calculations. 
 
 
This rise in financial linkages is particularly relevant when analyzing the 
vulnerability of the EMU's financial system to the public sector. Figure 4B shows 
banks' exposure to the public sector from other EMU member countries: on average, 
the level of EMU banks' international claims to EMU's public sector went up from 
4.7% of GDP in 1999 to 5.7% of GDP in 2008. However the pattern of this exposure 
is not homogeneous across EMU countries: while countries such as Belgium, the 




called "core" EMU countries in financial press) exhibited levels of banks' exposure 
above 5% of GDP in 2008, countries like Spain, Italy, Portugal, and Greece (part of 
the "peripheral" EMU area) had an exposure of 2% of GDP or lower in the same 
period. This pattern suggests that banks' resources to the public sector went from 




Figure 4B: Bank Exposure to the EMU’s Public Sector 
 
Note: Data for Germany is Foreign Claims to the Public sector (available data since March 2005). For 
France, data since June 2003. For Greece, data since December 2003. 
Source: BIS and IMF-WEO. Author’s calculations. 
 
 
As a consequence of this regional integration process, EMU countries have 
become more interconnected and at the same time more vulnerable to each other's 
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 Additional calculations show that banks' exposure to the public sector of Peripheral Euro Countries 
(PEC) - Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and Spain - in March 2008 were (as a percent of GDP): 9.8% 
for Belgium, 6.4% for the Netherlands, 5% for France, 4.3% for Germany, 2.4% for Austria, 0.8% for 




idiosyncratic shocks: a (sovereign, financial, or sectorial) crisis in one country could 
spread to other EMU (creditor) countries through their financial sector. Given the 
magnitude of their banks' exposures, this could generate large disruptions in their 
domestic credit supply and in turn affect the real sector of their domestic economies. 
Since monetary policy is no longer in the hands of national governments and they 
face legal restrictions to implement regulations to capital movements, under this 
scenario, it is expected that EMU governments execute plans to mitigate the spillover 
effects of a crisis: extending support to their own financial system (e.g., Diamond and 
Dybvig, 1983) and/or giving support to countries in financial distress (and thereby 
indirectly support their own financial sector).
12
 In other words, EMU countries in 
strong economic position might be extending "implicit guarantees" to weak EMU 
countries in case of a financial distress.
13
 
Under these circumstances, it can be expected that investors internalize these 
"implicit guarantees" in their valuations of sovereign bonds, stimulating investors' 
reckless behavior regarding the monitoring macroeconomic fundamentals of weak 
economies. In this way, it is possible that investors consider the "non-bailout" clause 
and the SGP as non-credible fiscal rules, an idea that could be reinforced by the fact 
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 Claessens, Tong, and Zuccardi (2013) give evidence for the role of the financial channel in the 
spillover of the EMU crisis in 2010 and 2011. They show that policy announcements to mitigate the 
crisis impacted financially-constrained firms more, particularly in creditor countries with greater bank 
exposure to peripheral EMU countries. 
   In addition, Horvath and Huizinga (2011) show that the creation of the European Financial Stability 
Facility (EFSF) represented a direct bailout of heavily indebted EMU governments and an indirect 
bailout of holders of their bonds (EU banks with large exposures to countries in crisis, private 
investors, etc.). They conclude that the establishment of the EFSF represented a risk transfer from the 
financial sector to the government in creditor countries. 
13
 Henning and Kessler (2012) and Ang and Longstaff (2011) discuss this financial channel for the 
case of US states. They say that differences between the USA and the EMU in terms of bond 
ownership and regulatory frameworks make US banks unable to transmit shocks to US states as 
European banks does to European sovereign countries. This is one of the factors why systemic risk is 




that the largest EMU economies (i.e., Germany and France) violated the SGP fiscal 











 Let us assume an international capital market composed by debtor countries 
and multiple risk-neutral lenders. Each debtor country i borrows from international 
lenders and faces two possible states: one in which the country is in crisis, and the 
other one in which there is no crisis. The probability of crisis is given by θi. 
Once country i is in crisis, it has the possibility to default on its debt with the 
international lenders. The probability of default conditional on the occurrence of a 
crisis is given by (1-λ), where λ is the “recovery rate” or the probability that country i 
repays lenders during crisis. Consequently, country i's probability of default is given 
by θi(1-λ). 
Let us assume that the probability of crisis θi is a function of observable 
country-specific fundamentals xi (i.e., θi=θ(xi)). Also, for simplification, let us assume 
that the recovery rate λ is identical across countries. 
On the other side, the expected benefit of a risk-neutral lender buying country 
i's sovereign bond (i.e., expected benefit of lending to country i) is given by: 
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 For a detailed review of the weaknesses of the SGP, see Larch, van den Noord, and Jonung (2010). 
Also, a discussion about the problems of centralized fiscal rules (like the SGP) can be found in 
Wyplosz (2012). 
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                                          (1) 
 
where Ri is the gross interest rate that country i promises to pay the lender in case of 
no default.
16
 If country i is in crisis and decides to default on its debt, then lenders 
would not receive any payment (i.e., payment is zero). 
Assuming that each lender has the possibility to invest in a risk-free bond that 
pays an exogenous gross interest rate R
*
, lenders will buy country i's bond if the 
expected benefit of doing so is larger or equal to the benefit of the risk-free bond. 
Given the competition among lenders, each lender will face the following arbitrage 
condition: 
 
Consequently, Ri is given by: 
                                                (2) 
and the spread of country i over a risk-free interest rate (in the remainder, referred as 
"spreads") is given by: 
 
                                         (3) 
Let us call b the perceived probability that a country will receive an 
international rescue package in the event of a crisis. According to Dell'Ariccia et al. 
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 We assume that country i does not make a strategic default. In other words, if the country is not in 
crisis, it will always honor its debts. Consequently, lenders will receive payment Ri in either non-crisis 




(2002), there are three channels by which the expectation of an international rescue 
package could affect spreads: 
1. "Country moral hazard": b could affect observable fundamentals through 
government policies (i.e., xi= xi(b)). The expectation of a rescue package 
could affect the incentives of country i's authorities to carry out prudent 
macroeconomic policies and, in this way, it could indirectly affect the crisis 
probability. This means that θi could be a function of b (i.e., θi = θ[xi(b)]). 
2. "Direct effect": b could directly affect the probability of crisis, conditioning 
on fundamentals (i.e., θi=θ[xi(b),b]). For instance, the presence of an 
international "safety net" might reduce the probability of economic crises such 
as runs on a country i's debt or currency. 
3. "Investor (creditor) moral hazard": b could affect the recovery rate in event of 
a crisis (i.e., λ=λ(b)). The expectation of a rescue package could increase the 
expected amount of resources that a lender would receive as a repayment from 
country i in time of crisis (i.e., (∂λ(b)/∂b)>0). Since the lender's loss rate in 
crisis is lower, lenders could involve in reckless behaviors such as an 
increment of risky lending and/or a reduction in monitoring of country i's 
macroeconomic performance. 
The current analysis is focused on investor moral hazard. Similar to 
Dell'Ariccia et al. (2002), we control for country i's specific fundamentals in 
estimations shown in section Empirical Results (i.e., we assume fundamentals as 
predetermined
17
). In addition, we assume that θi does not directly depend on b, ruling 
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 In an analysis where both spreads and macroeconomic variables are endogenously determined, we 




out the second channel in which the expectation of rescue package has a direct effect 
on the probability of crisis.
18
 Consequently, equation (3) becomes: 
                                              (4) 
where spread si is a function of the risk-free interest rate R
*
, fundamental variables xi, 
and the perceived probability of rescue package b. 




1. Hypothesis 1 (Level Test): Holding constant the set of fundamentals X=(x1’, 
x2’,…, xk’)’, equation (4) implies that if ∂λ/∂b>0 then ∂si/∂b<0 for any country i. 
The intuition behind this hypothesis is that, under investor moral hazard, if the 
perceived probability of bailout rises, then lenders could expect that the recovery 
                                                                                                                                           
case, we are aware of the possibility that low levels of spreads could affect country authorities’ 
incentives to pursue prudent macroeconomic policies. Without excluding the existence of that channel, 
our empirical results are consistent with the hypothesis of creditor moral hazard, as can be seen in 
section Empirical Results. 
18
 Dell'Ariccia et al. (2002) has an interesting discussion of the implications of this assumption. 
According to them, if we allow the probability of crisis θi to depend on b, such as ∂θ(xi,b)/∂b<0, then     
we will have an identification problem since we would be unable to distinguish the effects on spreads 
attributable from moral hazard or those from "true risk reduction" generated by international crisis 
lending. 
    This "true risk reduction" generated by international crisis lending arises when international lending 
is part of a financial safety net that eliminates self-fulfilling debt runs (Sachs, 1984) or help to prevent 
bank runs triggered by shifts in exchange rate expectations. 
    This problem is relevant when analyzing the effect of IMF's lending on international risk pricing 
since one of the main mandates of the IMF is to help in the preservation of the stability of the global 
financial system. That implies that one the purposes of the IMF lending is to reduce the incidence of 
crisis. 
    We assume that this problem is less relevant when analyzing the effect of the European Monetary 
Union (EMU) on risk pricing because the SGP established a non-bailout rule among EMU member 
countries and the European Union had not created any institution to help countries in distress until the 
current financial crisis. Consequently, the existence of EMU does not imply the existence of a safety 
net per se among EMU members. However, the existence of one common currency, one Central Bank, 
and the strong financial ties produced in the intra-regional financial integration process could imply the 
existence of some implicit guarantees among EMU members in times of crises. We believe that this 
perception is captured by λ(b) instead of θ(xi,b) because the existence of those institutions does not 
necessarily change the incidence of crisis, but the implicit guarantee associated with those institutions 
could change lenders' perception of the losses they could face in crisis. 
19




rate also increases, which should be reflected in lower spreads. For instance, if 
country i is part of the EMU, lenders would expect a higher recovery rate for 
country i's bonds than for bonds of any other country outside of the EMU area 
due to the implicit guarantees among EMU members. Consequently, we should 
expect lower spreads for EMU countries. 
2. Hypothesis 2 (Slope Test): Holding constant the set of fundamentals X=(x1’, 
x2’,…, xk’)’, equation (4) implies that if ∂λ/∂b>0 then ∂
2
si/∂xij∂b<0 for any 
country i and any country-specific fundamental xij (assuming that ∂θi/∂xij>0). 
As explained by Dell'Ariccia et al. (2002), under the lender's standpoint, a 
higher recovery rate represents a higher probability that lenders get off "scot-
free" in times of crisis. Consequently, lenders have less incentives to carry out 
prudent lending policies such as avoiding to lend to countries with high 
probability of crisis and/or monitoring debtor country's fundamentals. In the 
extreme case that λ(b)=1, all countries would pay the same risk-free interest rate, 
regardless of their fundamentals. In our case, if country i is part of the EMU, a 
higher lenders' perception of bailout generates that they reduce monitoring on 
country i's fundamentals.  
Finally, let Δs=sm – sn, m≠n where sm and sn are spreads of two countries m and n. 
3. Hypothesis 3 (Variance Test): Holding constant the set of fundamentals 
X=(x1’, x2’,…, xk’)’, equation (4) implies that if ∂λ/∂b>0 then ∂Δs/∂b<0 for any 
two countries m and n, m≠n for which we can approximate Δs=sm – sn by a first-




Hypothesis 3 states that a higher probability of being bailed out reduces the 
spread difference between any pair of countries, with a decrease more 
pronounced for countries with higher spreads. As lenders pay less attention to 
differences in fundamentals across countries, the differences between spreads 
should narrow. In the case of EMU countries, if countries m and n are part of the 
EMU zone, the higher perception of bailout not only reduces the level of the 
spread for both countries m and n, but also the fall in spreads should be more 
pronounced for the country with higher initial spreads. Consequently, we should 
expect a decline in the cross-country variance of spreads among EMU countries 




In order to test the hypotheses stated in subsection Basic Structure (level test, 
slope test, and variance test), we use different econometric methods: a. Panel-Data 
with random effects, b. Mixed model Panel-Data, and c. Difference-in-Difference 
approach. 
 
A. Panel data with random effects 
Let us assume the following econometric model: 
                                         (5) 
 
for i=1,…,N and t=1,…,Ti, where N is the number of countries, and Ti is the number 




In this model yit is the dependent variable (i.e., log(Spreadit)), xit is a set of 
independent variables that includes both country-specific macroeconomic 
fundamentals and global market indicators, α and β are parameters, ϑi is an 
unobserved country specific effect, and εit is an error term. Let us assume that the 
country-specific effect ϑi is independent and identically distributed with mean zero 
and variance σϑ
2
 (i.e., ϑi ∼iid(0, σϑ
2
)) and independent of xit. In addition, let us assume 
that the error term εit has an autoregressive structure AR(1) given by: 
                                                 (6) 
 
where |ρ|<1 and ηit is an error term that is independent and identically distributed 
with mean zero and variance ση
2





1. Level Test: In order to test whether there is a fall in the spread level when 
country i is member of the EMU, we modify equation (5) as follows: 
                                   (7) 
where dit is a dummy variable with the following values: 
                              (8) 
 
Consequently, we test whether β1 has a negative value. In terms of hypothesis 
testing, we have: 
 
If our model is correct, we expect the null hypothesis to be rejected, showing 
that country members of the EMU face, in general, lower spreads than 
countries outside the EMU. 
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 We included an autoregressive error term in order to capture a possible persistence effect on spreads 




2. Slope Test: In this case, we modify equation (7) as follows: 
                     (9) 
where x
f
it is the subset of independent variables xit that represents the country 
i's macroeconomic fundamentals, and γ captures the interaction effects 
between x
f
it and dit. This term γ represents the average change in the slope 
coefficient of x
f
it due to the fact that country i is a member of the EMU. In 
other words, the slope coefficient of a macroeconomic fundamental variable 
x
f
kit is given by: 
 
 
If international lenders reduce monitoring on fundamental x
f
kit, then we expect 
that parameter γk has a contrary sign to the the sign of parameter βk. This 
result represents that the relationship between x
f
kit and spreads is weaker by 
the fact that country i is part of the EMU area. 
3. Variance Test: In this case, let us assume that spreads of EMU countries are 
given by: 
                             (10) 
for country i that is part of the EMU area. In this case, the parameter β
0
 
captures both the parameters associated with independent variables xit and the 
slope change parameter γ shown in equation (9). 
Similarly, spreads for countries that are not part of the EMU zone are given 
by: 




for country j which is not part of the EMU area. 
Based on equations (10) and (11), the cross-country variance of each group of 
countries is given by: 
                  (12) 
 and 
                  (13) 
Therefore, if we take the difference between equations (12) and (13), we have: 
           (14) 
Under investor moral hazard we expect the cross-country variance of spreads 
of EMU countries to be lower than the variance for countries outside of EMU 
area. In terms of hypothesis testing, we have that: 
                           (15) 
Consequently, if the null hypothesis is rejected, then the cross-country 
variance of EMU members is lower than that of non-EMU countries. 
 
B. Mixed models panel data 
In order to check the robustness of our results, we use a panel data mixed 
model which allows us to evaluate whether the results of the level and slope tests still 
hold or are driven by some random effect on the parameters. For that, spreads have 
the following structure: 




where zit are observable variables, ui is a random variable with mean zero and 
covariance matrix Σu (i.e., ui∼iid(0,Σu)), and εit is a random term with the following 
autoregressive structure: 
                                                 (6) 
 
where |ρ|<1 and ηit ∼iid(0, ση
2
). The conditional mean of yit is given by α + xitβ 
whereas the error term is given by zitui + εit. 
In this estimation, we included in zit some of the country i's macroeconomic 
fundamentals also included in xit.
21
 Therefore, the slope parameters for those 
fundamentals will have both a fixed and a random element. In order to conduct the 
level, slope and variance test, we modify equation (16) similar to it was done in 
equations (7), (9), and (14). 
 
C. Difference-in-difference approach 
As an additional exercise, we use the difference-in-difference approach to 
evaluate our results. Under this approach, we are interested in capturing the effects of 
a policy change (or "treatment") on our dependent variable. In this case, the 
"treatment" is the fact that country i becomes a member of the EMU area from period 
t onward. Therefore, our country sample is divided in two groups: 1) the set of 
countries that are members of the EMU area (the "treatment" group), and 2) the set of 
countries that are not members of the EMU area (the "control" group). 
In general, the difference-in-difference approach estimates the average change 
in the output variable for the "treatment" group generated by the fact that this group 
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 The term zit also includes a vector of ones in order to capture the country specific random effect ϑi 




was exposed to the "treatment". In order to do that, this methodology considers two 
steps: a) first, for each group, it calculates the difference between the average value of 
the output variable before and after the "treatment" in order to control for biases 
caused by permanent time trends or unobserved time phenomena affecting both 
groups; and b) second, it calculates the difference between the "treatment" and the 
"control" groups in order to remove biases caused by permanent differences between 
the groups or unobserved individual phenomena not related with the "treatment".
22
 
Under this approach, equation (7) becomes: 
                                  (17) 
for i=1,…,N and t=1,…,Ti, where N is the number of countries, and Ti is the number 
of periods the country i is observed in the sample. 
We assume that the unobserved country-specific effect ϑi is a fixed effect. In 
addition, we include a parameter φt to capture unobserved time-specific effects (also 
fixed). These two parameters allow us to control for individual and time differences 
between the "treatment" and the "control" groups that are not related to the 
"treatment" (i.e., for individual and time biases, respectively). The variable dit is still 
defined as in equation (8), allowing us to capture the effect of the "treatment". 
Finally, we assume the error term εit to be independent and identically distributed 
with mean zero and variance σε
2
. 
In order to conduct the slope and variance tests, we modify equation (17) 
similarly to what was done in equations (9) and (14), respectively. 
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In the following, we describe the dependent variable and independent 
variables (country fundamental indicators, global market conditions, and additional 
indicators) used in the empirical analyses of section Empirical Results. Table 1 
displays descriptive statistics of both the dependent and the independent variables. 
Dependent Variable: For the estimation of the models proposed in the 
previous subsection, we use sovereign bond spreads from January 1996 to March 
2008 as dependent variable. For developed economies, the sovereign spread is 
computed as the difference between country i's 10-year government bond yield and 
the US 10-year government bond yield. In case of EMU countries, we do the same 
calculation but with respect to the German 10-year government bond yield, as 
commonly used in the literature of sovereign risk. For emerging markets, we use 




As independent variables, we include the following information: 
1. Country fundamentals: we control for the commonly used indicators in the 
empirical literature on sovereign risk, such as: a) the government debt-to-GDP 
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 Unfortunately, there is not a homogeneous measure of sovereign bond spreads between developed 
and developing economies that covers a period before and after the establishment of the EMU area. On 
the one hand, most of the emerging economies do not issue 10-year bonds in foreign currency (i.e., US 
dollars or Euros) and their issuances in domestic currency have strong effects of currency volatility 
and/or low demand. On the other hand, JP Morgan, who is the company that calculates the EMBI 
global index (and spreads) for emerging economies, does not calculate an equivalent index for 
developed ones. Consequently, we work with the most common definitions of bond spreads used in the 
literature of sovereign risk. 
    Regarding to the difference in currencies (US dollars and Euros), as Fratzscher (2002) states, the 
underlying assumption of using yields in different currencies is that investors are able to hedge at least 
some of their foreign exchange exposure between these two currencies. This is a plausible assumption 
in today's growing world of financial derivatives. 
    We estimated a poolability test in order to establish whether we can do a pool of these series. We 
found that we have no statistical evidence to reject the hypothesis that these series can be in pool 




ratio, b) the government balance-to-GDP ratio (these last two variables as 
indicators of country i's financial solvency), c) the GDP annual growth rate, d) 
the international reserves-to-GDP ratio (as indicator of country i's 




2. Global market conditions: we also control for commonly used indicators of 
global investors' risk aversion and global liquidity conditions, such as: a) the 
VIX index (capturing the market's expectation of stock market volatility, a 
measure of changes in investors' risk appetite), b) the US FED policy rate (as 
standard measure of global liquidity conditions), and c) TED spreads (as 
indicator of perceived credit risk in the interbank lending market).
25
 
3. Further indicators: we include further covariates in order to control for other 
relevant country characteristics, such as: a) the de facto Exchange Rate 
Regime based on Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) (to capture possible effects of 
currency regime - and currency risk- on sovereign default risk), b) sovereign 
credit rating from International Investors Magazine (to reflect the effect of 
credit qualification on the borrowing cost that countries face
26
), c) outstanding 
                                                 
24
 For public debt and fiscal balance we use information of the general government when available. 
Otherwise, we use central government information. 
    In earlier versions of this document, we also included other variables commonly mentioned in the 
literature, such as: a) the current account balance-to-GDP ratio, b) the trade balance-to-GDP ratio, and 
c) the annual growth rate of industrial production. However, we found that their estimated coefficients 
were not statistically significant in any specification. 
25
 TED spreads are calculated as the difference between the interest rate paid by interbank loans and 
the interest rate paid by a short-term US government bond (T-bills). An increment of TED spreads 
represents a higher perceived risk of default on interbank loans, a measure of the conditions of the 
credit market. 
26
 The sovereign credit rating from International Investors Magazine is an annual index that measures 
the default risk based on a local survey of leading economists in each country. This index goes from 0 




amount of international debt securities issued by country i's government (to 
capture the effect of international bonds' liquidity on spreads), d) the annual 
growth rate of the stock market (reflecting possible changes in demand for 
country i's assets, the "exuberance" effect
27
), e) the ratio of the sum of 
international assets and liabilities to GDP (capturing the effect of the de facto 
financial integration on spreads). 
We use monthly series of spreads and market variables, and other 
variables at their shortest frequency (quarterly, or annually). Information for 
spreads is collected from Bloomberg and Thompson-Reuters Datastream. 
Information of country fundamentals are mainly collected from national sources 
(Central Banks, Ministry of Finance, etc.), IMF-IFS and the Inter-American 
Development Bank. Data of global market conditions stem from Bloomberg and 
Thompson-Reuters Datastream. Finally, data to calculate further indicators come 
from International Investors Magazine, BIS, Bloomberg, and Lane and Milesi-
Ferretti (2007). 
                                                                                                                                           
Given that sovereign credit ratings are based on information of country-specific fundamentals, we have 
a collinearity problem if we directly include this variable as independent variable for spreads. 
Consequently, we previously estimated a regression with ratings as dependent variable and all country-
specific fundamentals as independent ones. Later, we included the orthogonal part of this estimation as 
one explanatory variable of spreads. 
27
 In the same way as sovereign credit ratings, the behavior of the stock market index could depend on 
country-specific macroeconomic fundamentals. Consequently, as we did with sovereign credit ratings, 
we previously estimated a regression which uses the annual growth rate of the stock market index as 
dependent variable and macroeconomic fundamentals as independent ones. Later, we used the 







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 2 shows the estimated results for equation (7) using panel data with 
random effects. Macroeconomic fundamentals such as public debt, international 
reserves, inflation, fiscal balance, and the growth rate of GDP are lagged in order to 
avoid any endogeneity problem in our estimations. As can be seen, most of the 
independent variables have the expected sign and, in most cases, they are statistically 
significant. For instance, regarding to macroeconomic fundamentals, we find that 
public debt has a positive and significant sign (i.e., higher public debt levels are 
associated with higher spreads). This result represents that lenders might perceive that 




With regard to fiscal balance, we find that the sign is negative and significant: 
large fiscal deficits might imply large financing needs by the government (i.e., public 
debt accumulation) and/or future inability to honor government's debts. 
Consequently, lenders might request a higher yield to be compensated for the higher 
default risk. The GDP growth rate is negatively associated with spreads (although not 
significant): if a country is facing an economic boom, then its government might be 
able to collect larger current revenues (i.e., tax revenues, profits from public 
companies, etc.) than in times of an economic bust and, therefore, the perceived 
default risk on government debt is lower. In addition, international reserves have a 
                                                 
28
 We included the square of public debt in order to capture a nonlinear relationship between this 
variable and spreads. We found that the square of public debt is not significant. Its sign is negative, a 




negative sign (although not significant): lenders might consider that a country with a 
high reserves level has resources in foreign currency to be able to honor its 
international payments in all states, even during crisis. Finally, the sign of inflation is 
positive (and significant) because high inflation represents macroeconomic instability 
and, therefore, a higher probability of default. 
With respect to global market indicators, bond spreads are positively 
correlated with the VIX index. For instance, if the VIX index increases (i.e., there is a 
fall in investors' risk appetite), then lenders are less willing to buy government bonds 
and, therefore, they have to be compensated with an increase in the return of these 
bonds, raising spreads. Finally, the correlation between spreads and the US policy 
interest rate is negative in this estimation. Even though this result is counter-intuitive, 
it is not uncommon in the literature on the determinants of sovereign spreads. Studies 
such as Eichengreen and Mody (1998), Kamin and von Kleist (1999), McGuire and 
Schrijvers (2003), Baldacci et al. (2008), and Noy (2008) have found similar results.
29
 
With respect to further indicators, the measure of debt-securities liquidity is 
negative (although not significant): more liquid sovereign bonds tend to have lower 
spreads (i.e., liquidity premium). In addition, the annual growth rate of the stock 
market index is negative and significant. It seems that periods of high demand for 
country i's financial assets are associated with high demand for government bonds 
and, therefore, the bond price rises and the yield falls, reflected in a reduction of 
spreads. It must be taken into account that our measure of stock market index is 
                                                 
29
 McGuire and Schrijvers (2003) state that there is an open discussion on the relationship between US 
interest rates and bond spreads. The results depend on the type of market spreads used (primary or 
secondary markets), the inclusion/exclusion of certain emerging market issuers, the time period under 
consideration, and the regression technique applied to the data. See McGuire and Schrijvers (2003) for 




previously controlled by country i's macroeconomic fundamentals, which means that 
this correlation is not attributed to the general macroeconomic conditions of that 
country, but a general interest for its assets (i.e., an "exuberance" effect).  
Finally, we include an indicator of multilateral financial integration. As 
explained above, this variable calculates the amount of international assets and 
liabilities that the country i has with other countries with respect to the size of its 
economy. Column 8 shows that financial integration is negatively correlated with 
spreads, which means that countries having larger financial linkages with other 
countries tend to have lower spreads. This result might reflect that, in general, a 
reduction of transaction costs, harmonization of financial regulations, an increase in 
access to international capital flows (portfolio and/or foreign direct investment), etc., 
produce a fall in country i's financing costs.
30
 
The main result of Table 2 is that - after controlling for country fundamental 
indicators, global market conditions and other indicators - member countries of the 
EMU area have, on average, lower spreads than countries outside of this area. As 
shown in the first row of this Table, the "Eurozone" dummy is negative and 





                                                 
30
 One way to understand this result is that the financial liberalization could generate a price 
convergence process, in which asset prices from different countries tend to satisfy the one-price law. In 
other words, prices of financial assets with the same quality (i.e., same payoff structure, same risk 
level, etc.) but from different countries will tend to be equal when transaction barriers and costs are 
eliminated, and only reflect the risk associated with that asset.  




Table 2: Sovereign Debt Risk and Determinants 
Panel Data with Random Effects. Sample: Monthly information Jan 1996 to Mar 2008 
 
Dependent Variable: Log (Sovereign Bond Spreads)
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Eurozone -0.9053*** -0.9136*** -0.8971*** -0.8973*** -0.9073*** -0.9168*** -0.9228*** -0.8226***
[0.2178] [0.2183] [0.2170] [0.2170] [0.1948] [0.1933] [0.1919] [0.1933]
Public Debt (1) 0.8150*** 1.8701** 1.2607 1.2634 1.7733** 1.7476** 2.3043*** 2.1208***
[0.2900] [0.8462] [0.8593] [0.8597] [0.7840] [0.7900] [0.7946] [0.7921]
Square Public Debt (1) -0.7322 -0.4704 -0.4727 -0.4291 -0.4053 -0.7208 -0.653
[0.5498] [0.5527] [0.5531] [0.5157] [0.5149] [0.5151] [0.5125]
Fiscal Balance (1) -6.0288*** -5.9957*** -5.6018*** -5.5324*** -5.4659*** -5.3235***
[1.8044] [1.8228] [1.6710] [1.6621] [1.6571] [1.6451]
GDP (2) -0.1727 -0.5446 -0.6107 -0.8618 -0.8584
[1.3028] [1.2847] [1.2799] [1.2720] [1.2690]
Credit Rating (IIR) -0.0408*** -0.0411*** -0.0420*** -0.0396***
[0.0041] [0.0041] [0.0041] [0.0041]
Liquidity 0.0089 0.0051 -0.0287
[0.0521] [0.0518] [0.0524]
Nat Stock Market Index -0.4373*** -0.4227***
[0.1031] [0.1030]
Financial Int. (Lane-Milesi) -0.0748***
[0.0240]
Reserves (1) 1.0096 1.0531 1.17 1.1809 -0.4706 -0.4544 -0.4724 -0.9085
[0.9990] [1.0009] [0.9877] [0.9903] [0.8271] [0.8516] [0.8513] [0.8501]
Inflation 1.4476 1.7444 2.0582* 2.0494* 2.1341* 2.1496* 1.8557 2.0581*
[1.1561] [1.1802] [1.1803] [1.1829] [1.1510] [1.1438] [1.1375] [1.1356]
VIX 0.0273*** 0.0273*** 0.0270*** 0.0270*** 0.0307*** 0.0310*** 0.0307*** 0.0298***
[0.0028] [0.0028] [0.0028] [0.0028] [0.0028] [0.0028] [0.0028] [0.0028]
US FED Interest Rate -0.0547** -0.0543** -0.0510** -0.0506** -0.0508** -0.0499** -0.0478** -0.0456*
[0.0248] [0.0249] [0.0249] [0.0251] [0.0247] [0.0243] [0.0239] [0.0239]
Dummy Exchange Rate 
Regime Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Dummy Asian, Russian, 
Argentine Crises
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant 3.0228*** 2.7157*** 2.7969*** 2.7995*** 2.7046*** 2.6221*** 2.5085*** 3.1979***
[0.3202] [0.3954] [0.3921] [0.3926] [0.3491] [0.5847] [0.5804] [0.6177]
No. Obs 2317 2317 2317 2317 2317 2317 2317 2317
No. Countries 31 31 31 31 31 31 31 31
R2 overall 0.5602 0.5561 0.5751 0.575 0.7868 0.788 0.7926 0.7924
Rho AR(1) error 0.861 0.862 0.8621 0.862 0.8594 0.8543 0.8516 0.8515  
Robust standard errors in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
(1) As % of GDP. (2) Annual growth rate 







Table 3 shows the results of the slope test for the case of the random effects 
method. Here, we include an interaction variable between the dummy variable 
"Eurozone" and each country-specific fundamental variable (i.e., public debt, fiscal 
balance, GDP annual growth rate, international reserves, and inflation) in order to 
capture any change in the estimated coefficients due to the fact that the country is part 
of the EMU area. As explained above, this test could help us discover whether or not 
the relationship between country-specific fundamentals and spreads is weaker by the 
fact that country i is part of the EMU area. 
As seen in Table 3, the estimated coefficient of the "Eurozone" dummy is still 
negative and significant. In addition, we observe that the estimated coefficients of the 
country-specific fundamental variables still have the expected signs and, in most 
cases, they are significant. Also, we see a significant change in slope for public debt, 
fiscal balance, and GDP growth rate for EMU country members. 
For instance, the fiscal balance is negative and significant. However, the 
interaction effect between fiscal balance and Eurozone dummy is positive (although 
no significant). For the model in column 8 (which has the best parameterization and a 
larger overall R²), we tested the hypothesis whether the sum of the estimated 
coefficients for fiscal balance and the interaction effect is equal zero, and found that 
this hypothesis cannot be rejected.
31
 Consequently, this result suggests that the 
correlation between spreads and fiscal balance is lower for EMU area member 
countries. 
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Table 3: Inclusion of EMU effects 
Panel Data with Random Effects. Sample: Monthly information Jan 1996 to Mar 2008 
 
Dependent Variable: Log (Sovereign Bond Spreads)
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Eurozone -2.5389*** -3.3213*** -3.3721*** -4.1790*** -4.0114*** -4.0349*** -3.7994*** -3.4823***
[0.4862] [0.7668] [0.7647] [0.7866] [0.7094] [0.7078] [0.7064] [0.7305]
Public Debt (1) 0.3508 0.9172 0.2109 0.1839 0.5449 0.529 1.2188 1.2376
[0.3252] [0.9655] [0.9796] [0.9701] [0.8750] [0.8808] [0.8872] [0.8869]
Pub. Debt*Eurozone 1.2827** 3.6990* 3.9866** 4.6544** 5.4136*** 5.4526*** 4.9283*** 4.4429**
[0.5055] [1.9529] [1.9701] [1.9629] [1.8005] [1.8007] [1.7940] [1.8157]
Square Public Debt (1) -0.3917 -0.0779 -0.0875 0.0525 0.0662 -0.3164 -0.3327
[0.6490] [0.6529] [0.6469] [0.6011] [0.6016] [0.6014] [0.6012]
Sq. Pub. Debt*Eurozone -1.5302 -1.6658 -1.8952 -2.5048** -2.5271** -2.2699** -2.0314*
[1.2359] [1.2421] [1.2365] [1.1588] [1.1581] [1.1530] [1.1610]
Fiscal Balance (1) -7.0128*** -6.6382*** -5.8859*** -5.8675*** -5.5380*** -5.5641***
[2.1460] [2.1605] [1.9091] [1.9112] [1.9080] [1.9070]
Fiscal Bal.*Eurozone 3.5275 3.3038 1.1451 1.1652 0.3531 0.819
[3.7609] [3.7559] [3.5284] [3.5324] [3.5224] [3.5319]
GDP (2) -1.0202 -1.1404 -1.1645 -1.3682 -1.4309
[1.3184] [1.3006] [1.3020] [1.2947] [1.2949]
GDP*Eurozone 17.3117*** 12.6534*** 12.7599*** 12.4600** 13.3038***
[5.1402] [4.8881] [4.8781] [4.8506] [4.8757]
Credit Rating (IIR) -0.0396*** -0.0396*** -0.0405*** -0.0390***
[0.0040] [0.0040] [0.0040] [0.0040]
Liquidity 0.0007 -0.0005 -0.0204
[0.0498] [0.0497] [0.0511]
Nat Stock Market Index -0.4282*** -0.4217***
[0.1026] [0.1026]
Financial Int. (Lane-Milesi) -0.0419*
[0.0249]
Constant 3.7020*** 3.5315*** 3.6379*** 3.7794*** 3.6135*** 3.6116*** 3.4213*** 3.7313***
[0.3447] [0.4312] [0.4275] [0.4239] [0.3764] [0.5894] [0.5863] [0.6143]
No. Obs 2317 2317 2317 2317 2317 2317 2317 2317
No. Countries 31 31 31 31 31 31 31 31
R2 overall 0.5887 0.5803 0.6084 0.6177 0.807 0.8073 0.8108 0.8105
Rho AR(1) error 0.8525 0.8529 0.853 0.845 0.8431 0.8413 0.8392 0.8393  
Controlled by international reserves, inflation rate, VIX index, US FED interest Rate, Exchange Rate 
Regime, Asian, Russian and Argentine Crises Dummies. 
Robust standard errors in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
(1) As % of GDP. (2) Annual growth rate 
Source: Author's calculations 
 
Regarding the GDP growth rate, its coefficient is negative (although not 




significant. Consequently, the coefficient of GDP growth rate is smaller if the country 
is part of the EMU area. 
Table 3 also shows a particular phenomenon related to the estimated 
coefficient of public debt: in the panel estimations we included public debt and 
squared public debt in order to capture a non-linear relationship between spreads and 
public debt. In the estimations of Table 2 we see that the coefficient of squared public 
debt is negative (albeit not significant), which suggests a slightly concave relationship 
between public debt and spreads. However, in Table 3 we see that the interaction 
effect between squared public debt and the "Eurozone" dummy is negative and 
significant suggesting that the results of Table 3 were mainly driven by EMU 
countries.
32
 In particular, countries like Greece, Italy, and Belgium have historically 
exhibited public debt levels above 85% of GDP and enjoyed low interest rates 
borrowing from international capital markets.
33
 This result suggests that spreads of 
EMU countries are less sensitive to a high level of public debt than spreads of an 
"average" non-EMU country. This could be interpreted that lenders perceive a lower 
default risk at high debt levels if the country is part of the EMU zone in comparison 
with a country outside the EMU zone.
34
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 The coefficient of squared public debt is still negative (not significant) but its value fell 49% in 
comparison with the results from Table 2. 
33
 A similar result is found by Bernoth et al. (2012) in a study of primary market's sovereign spreads 
for European countries. 
34
 We also find similar behaviors for international reserves and inflation. First, we find a negative and 
significant coefficient for international reserves. However, the interaction effect between international 
reserves and the Eurozone dummy is positive and significant, suggesting that spreads have weaker 
relationship with international reserves if the country is part of the EMU area. Second, our results show 
a positive and significant coefficient for the inflation rate. But the interaction effect of this variable 
with the Eurozone dummy is negative and significant. Therefore, there is a weaker relationship 
between spreads and the inflation rate if the country is a member of the Eurozone. Although these 




Overall, our results seem to confirm that lenders pay less attention to 
fundamentals related to fiscal position (public debt and fiscal balance) and GDP 
growth when they trade with bonds from EMU zone countries. In particular, they are 
less sensitive to larger levels of public debt when the country is an EMU member. 
 
Results with Mixed Models 
 
Table 4 displays estimations of equation (9) using mixed models.
35
 As shown 
in this table, all variables maintain their expected sign. 
Table 4 also shows that the "Eurozone" dummy is negative and significant, 
which means that EMU countries have, on average, lower spreads than countries not 
part of that area. 
Regarding the fiscal balance, its coefficient is negative and significant but its 
interaction effect with the "Eurozone" dummy is positive. We performed a Wald test 
under the null hypothesis that the sum of these two coefficients is equal zero and we 
could not reject the null hypothesis at 5% significance.
36
 Therefore, similar to the 
case with random effects, sovereign bond spreads are negatively associated with the 
level of fiscal balance but this correlation is lower (and statistically equal zero) when 
a country is part of the EMU area. 
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 Since equation (9) includes the "Eurozone" coefficient as one of the regressors, we are not only 
testing change in the slopes for macroeconomic fundamentals, but also a change in the level of spreads. 
In these estimations we included country-specific fundamentals such as fiscal balance, GDP growth 
rate, and public debt in the term zit of equation (16). The reason is that those fundamentals are 
consistently significant in Tables 2 and 3. Also, because they exhibit large changes in slopes when a 
country is an EMU member. Consequently, we want to test whether those changes in slope are not 
caused by a random effect. 
36




Table 4: Level and Slope Tests I 
Mixed Models Panel Data. Sample: Monthly information Jan 1996 to Mar 2008 
Dependent Variable: Log (Sovereign Bond Spreads)
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Eurozone -1.7570*** -2.2779*** -2.3673*** -2.9535*** -3.0869*** -3.0736*** -2.8562*** -2.5568***
[0.5804] [0.8804] [0.8808] [0.9080] [0.8233] [0.8259] [0.8280] [0.8525]
Public Debt (1) 0.261 1.6134 1.275 1.3164 1.4463 1.4201 1.6697 1.7957*
[0.3766] [1.1100] [1.1407] [1.1426] [1.0453] [1.0575] [1.0592] [1.0562]
Pub. Debt*Eurozone 0.8673 2.0264 1.9668 2.367 3.4768* 3.4475* 2.9971 2.5394
[0.5553] [2.1481] [2.1900] [2.1992] [2.0236] [2.0295] [2.0285] [2.0466]
Square Public Debt (1) -1.0363 -1.0646 -1.1682 -1.1124 -1.0906 -1.1826 -1.3063*
[0.7600] [0.7970] [0.8050] [0.7488] [0.7538] [0.7490] [0.7505]
Sq. Pub. Debt*Eurozone -0.5296 -0.3448 -0.4072 -1.1574 -1.1483 -0.933 -0.6508
[1.3503] [1.3897] [1.3975] [1.3094] [1.3117] [1.3068] [1.3175]
Fiscal Balance (1) -6.0277** -6.0762** -6.5451*** -6.5299*** -6.4711*** -6.4113***
[2.6865] [2.6554] [2.2243] [2.2371] [2.2378] [2.2214]
Fiscal Bal.*Eurozone -0.0772 0.1048 0.8632 0.86 0.3656 0.4206
[4.5099] [4.4463] [3.8519] [3.8635] [3.8554] [3.8459]
GDP (2) -0.2493 -0.255 -0.2583 -0.637 -0.7485
[1.4082] [1.3936] [1.3964] [1.3916] [1.3916]
GDP*Eurozone 12.6719** 10.1564* 10.1971* 9.9439* 10.5465*
[5.6701] [5.5465] [5.5553] [5.5268] [5.5338]
Credit Rating (IIR) -0.0295*** -0.0293*** -0.0294*** -0.0287***
[0.0049] [0.0049] [0.0050] [0.0050]
Liquidity 0.0058 0.0058 -0.0135
[0.0632] [0.0634] [0.0640]




Constant 3.6782*** 3.3530*** 3.4397*** 3.5241*** 3.4255*** 3.3730*** 3.2744*** 3.5788***
[0.4168] [0.5029] [0.4992] [0.4982] [0.4482] [0.7336] [0.7334] [0.7553]
No. Obs 2317 2317 2317 2317 2317 2317 2317 2317
chi2 140.3547 144.3325 157.0984 164.3796 298.0251 293.3329 301.1912 315.281
p 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  
Controlled by international reserves, inflation rate, VIX index, US FED interest Rate, Exchange Rate 
Regime, Asian, Russian and Argentine Crises Dummies. 
Robust standard errors in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
(1) As % of GDP. (2) Annual growth rate 
Source: Author's calculations 
 
The GDP growth rate shows a negative relationship with spreads, but its 
interaction effect is positive and significant, confirming our previous results with 




spreads is positive and significant. However, squared public debt is negative, similar 
to the results found with random effects. Yet, in this case, the main coefficient is 
significant, which is contradictory to the results shown in Table 3. 
In conclusion, using this methodology, we find that EMU zone members have 
a lower level of spreads and that these spreads are less correlated with fiscal balance 
and the GDP growth rate than spreads for an "average" non-EMU country. These 
results suggest that lenders have lower incentives to monitor those country-specific 
fundamentals than they do with an "average" country. 
 
Results with the Difference-in-Difference Approach 
 
In addition to the random and mixed effects panel data methods, we applied 
the difference-in-difference approach to conduct the slope test.
37
 Table 5 shows the 
results using this methodology. First, we find that the "Eurozone" dummy is negative 
and significant, confirming our previous results that, on average, EMU countries have 
a lower spreads level. Consequently, countries that joined the EMU enjoyed lower 
borrowing costs than non-EMU countries. 
Regarding public debt, we find that spreads and public debt have a convex 
relationship for the average country, as expected from theory. In other words, there is 
a non-linear positive relationship between these two variables: as public debt grows, 
spreads increase more than proportional in order to compensate international creditors 
for the rise of the default risk. However, as we found in previous estimations, if the 
                                                 
37
 Similar to the results of mixed models, in this regression we are including the dummy "Eurozone" as 





country is part of the EMU area, this relationship becomes concave, suggesting that 
spreads are less sensitive to larger debt levels when the country is part of the EMU. 
 
Table 5: Level and Slope Tests II 
      Difference-in-Difference Approach. Sample: Monthly information Jan 1996 to Mar 2008 
Dependent Variable: Log (Sovereign Bond Spreads)
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Eurozone -1.9068*** -3.6258*** -4.5721*** -5.4979*** -5.6248*** -5.5267*** -5.6910*** -5.7318***
[0.6328] [0.8064] [0.7889] [0.8668] [0.8684] [0.8671] [0.8735] [0.8696]
Public Debt (1) 1.3525 -1.85 -2.6488* -2.7121** -3.3848*** -3.1018** -1.9047 -1.8121
[0.9930] [1.2968] [1.3651] [1.3020] [1.0738] [1.1310] [1.1813] [1.1886]
Pub. Debt*Eurozone 2.0725*** 7.6087*** 9.4396*** 9.8289*** 10.4708*** 10.4194*** 10.4817*** 10.6779***
[0.7428] [1.7929] [1.8711] [1.6598] [1.7142] [1.6910] [1.5995] [1.5340]
Square Public Debt (1) 2.1420*** 2.5397*** 2.5064*** 3.0849*** 3.0000*** 2.3533*** 2.3214***
[0.6700] [0.6412] [0.5858] [0.5078] [0.5297] [0.5444] [0.5684]
Sq. Pub. Debt*Eurozone -3.7951*** -4.6163*** -4.5477*** -5.0373*** -5.0148*** -5.0656*** -5.2004***
[1.0634] [1.1693] [1.0244] [1.1036] [1.0731] [0.9826] [0.9177]
Fiscal Balance (1) -5.4895* -4.5967 -6.2315** -5.9825** -5.2751* -5.7166*
[2.8535] [2.8608] [2.5444] [2.6074] [2.6511] [2.9246]
Fiscal Bal.*Eurozone 12.8285** 10.5218** 10.0031** 9.2474** 9.9728** 10.3627**
[4.9864] [4.6465] [4.6760] [4.3650] [4.1461] [4.0465]
GDP (2) -1.4714 -1.2906 -1.6004 -1.4655 -1.7245
[1.1326] [1.1348] [1.1653] [1.2897] [1.2350]
GDP*Eurozone 20.8389*** 17.9288*** 17.8654*** 18.3347*** 18.4198***
[5.6999] [5.9312] [5.8179] [5.8725] [5.7935]
Credit Rating (IIR) -0.0363*** -0.0410*** -0.0446*** -0.0471***
[0.0125] [0.0129] [0.0128] [0.0137]
Liquidity -0.098 -0.0953 -0.0953
[0.1159] [0.1152] [0.1137]
Nat Stock Market Index -0.4852*** -0.4987***
[0.1640] [0.1642]
Financial Int. (Lane-Milesi) -0.0412
[0.0590]
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant 3.5353*** 4.4737*** 4.7882*** 4.8231*** 4.8869*** 5.6917*** 5.3276*** 5.3911***
[0.6968] [0.6714] [0.6676] [0.6555] [0.6680] [1.2357] [1.2482] [1.2240]
No. Obs 2414 2414 2414 2414 2414 2414 2414 2414
No. Countries 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30
R2 overall 0.1776 0.2108 0.3083 0.3083 0.7045 0.726 0.7395 0.7584  
Controlled by international reserves, inflation rate, VIX index, US FED interest Rate, Exchange Rate 
Regime, Asian, Russian and Argentine Crises Dummies. 
Robust standard errors in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
(1) As % of GDP. (2) Annual growth rate 




Similar to our previous results, for the average country, the fiscal balance has 
a negative and significant relationship with spreads. But, if the country is part of the 
EMU area, there is an additional positive effect that makes this relationship weaker.
38
    
Finally, we find that the GDP growth rate shows a negative relationship with spreads, 
but its interaction effect is positive and significant. Consequently, the coefficient of 
GDP growth rate is smaller if the country is part of the EMU area. 
In conclusion, we find that the relationships of sovereign spreads with public 
debt, fiscal balance, and economic growth are weaker for EMU countries, which 
suggests that creditors pay less attention to indicators of fiscal position and future 
debt dynamics when pricing sovereign bonds if the country is part of the EMU area. 
Our findings are in line with the results of Sgherri and Zoli (2009) and 
Manganelli and Wolswijk (2009), who conclude that Euro area sovereign spreads 
were driven by global risk repricing and global liquidity conditions (i.e., low global 
interest rates) until October 2008. After that date, spreads tended to reflect more 
country-specific fundamentals, in particular, those related to fiscal accounts and 
future debt dynamics. 
 
Variance Test 
In order to test whether there is a difference between cross-country variances 
of spreads for EMU member countries and for non-EMU countries, we first 
calculated the fitted values of spreads for the parameterization of column 8 in Tables 
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 Similar to the exercises with random effects and mixed model, we tested the null hypothesis that the 
sum of the coefficient for fiscal balance and the coefficient for the interaction of fiscal balance and 





3, 4, and 5. In a second step, we computed the cross-country variance of fitted spreads 
for each group per period. Finally, we computed a test of difference in variances. 
Figure 5 shows the p-value of the hypothesis test in equation (15) using 
random effects. We can reject the null hypothesis of equal variances at 10% 
significance for the period between January 1999 and October 2005. In other words, 
the cross-country variance of spreads for EMU country members is statistically lower 
than the variance of spreads for countries outside the EMU area in the above 
mentioned period. However, we do not have evidence to reject the null hypothesis 
after 2006. 
 
Figure 5: Variance Test with Random Effects 
 




Figure 6 shows the p-value of the hypothesis test in equation (15) using mixed 
model method. The result supports our previous result of Figure 5. Again, we can 
reject the null hypothesis of equal variances at 10% significance for the period 
January 1999 and October 2005 but not for the period after 2006. 
 
Figure 6: Variance Test with Mixed Model 
 
Source: Author’s calculations 
 
Finally, Figure 7 shows the p-value of the variance test with the difference-in-
difference approach. At 10% significance, we see that spreads of EMU member 
countries were close together even before the start of the EMU area, probably 
reflecting some anticipated convergence of spreads in expectation of the start of this 




EMU country members is statistically lower than the variance of spreads for countries 
outside the EMU area between 1999 and 2005. 
After 2005, this test is not able to reject the null hypothesis that the cross-
country variance of spreads for EMU countries is equal to the cross-country variance 
of spreads for non-EMU countries. This result is caused by the fact that spreads of 
Latin American countries and Russia started to fall and move closer to spreads of 
Asian and other European countries since 2006, reducing the cross-country variance 
of non-EMU countries (the variance of EMU countries has not significantly changed 
in that period). Even though this is out of the scope of this study, one explanation for 
this phenomenon might be that Latin America and Russia are net exporters of 
commodities and, therefore, it seems that this behavior is associated to the boom of 
commodity prices observed between 2006 and 2008. In other words, the rise of 
commodity prices during that period could increase the income of commodities 
export countries, which is, therefore, reflected in lower default risks and lower 
sovereign spreads. 
In conclusion, we find evidence that cross-country variance of spreads for 
EMU members is lower than that of non-EMU members between 1999 and end-2005. 
This result suggests that there was a convergence of spreads of EMU countries, with a 
faster fall in spreads from countries with larger perceived default risk. This finding 
could be interpreted as one of the symptoms of investor moral hazard explained in 






Figure 7: Variance Test with Difference in Difference 
 
    Source: Author’s calculations 
 
Robustness Test 
Catao and Kapur (2006) have pointed out that macroeconomic volatility plays 
a role in explaining why several countries face high levels of sovereign spreads under 
moderate levels of public debt-to-GDP ratio. In particular, they state that the 
historical volatility of GDP can affect the ability of countries to borrow in 
international markets. Their main result is that a larger volatility is associated with a 
higher default risk and, therefore, reflected in a higher risk premium at any given 
level of debt. 
In order to evaluate the robustness of our results in consideration of the 
findings by Catao and Kapur (2006), we included the GDP volatility as one of the 




took the logarithm of real quarterly GDP in US dollars; ii) we estimated the potential 
real GDP applying a Hodrick-Prescott filter (with smoothing parameter 1600 as usual 
with quarterly information) to the log of real GDP; iii) we calculated the cyclical part 
of GDP as the difference of the log of actual GDP minus the potential GDP; and iv) 
we calculated the GDP volatility as the standard deviation of the cyclical part of GDP 
with a rollover window of 8 quarters (2 years).
39
    This variable of GDP volatility is 
included with a lag in our regressions, in order to avoid endogeneity problems. 
Table 6 displays the results of the slope test using random effects model 
which includes GDP volatility. Column 1 shows our previous results of Table 3, 
column 8. Column 2 includes the GDP volatility for a 2-year rollover window.
40
 We 
observe that GDP volatility is positive and significant, which means that higher 
historical volatility is associated with higher spreads. Also, we see that our main 
results do not change with the inclusion of GDP volatility: i) spreads of the EMU 
members tend to be lower on average, ii) there is a negative correlation of fiscal 
balance and spreads, but this correlation is lower if the country is part of the EMU 
area,
41
 and iii) there is a negative correlation between GDP and spreads, but if the 
country is part of the EMU area, this correlation is lower. Regarding public debt, the 
level is positive and significant for both the general sample and EMU members, and 
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 We also calculated and estimated the models using a 3-year, 4-year, and 5-year rollover window. 
40
 Similar results can be found using a 3-year, 4-year, or 5-year windows. 
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Table 6: With GDP Volatility I 
Panel Data with Random Effect 




Public Debt (1) 1.2376 1.5031*
[0.8869] [0.8979]
Pub. Debt*Eurozone 4.4429** 3.9621**
[1.8157] [1.8191]
Square Public Debt (1) -0.3327 -0.5535
[0.6012] [0.6190]
Sq. Pub. Debt*Eurozone -2.0314* -1.7488
[1.1610] [1.1670]
Fiscal Balance (1) -5.5641*** -5.3151***
[1.9070] [1.9100]
Fiscal Bal.*Eurozone 0.819 0.4414
[3.5319] [3.5308]








Nat Stock Market Index -0.4217*** -0.4503***
[0.1026] [0.1028]
Financial Int. (Lane-Milesi) -0.0419* -0.0479*
[0.0249] [0.0247]
GDP Volatility





No. Obs 2317 2296
No. Countries 31 31
R2 overall 0.8105 0.8155
Rho AR(1) error 0.8393 0.8322  
Controlled by international reserves, inflation rate, VIX index, US FED interest Rate, Exchange Rate 
Regime, Asian, Russian and Argentine Crises Dummies. 
(1) As % of GDP. (2) Annual growth rate 




Table 7 shows the results of the same exercise using the difference-in-
difference approach. Again, column 1 shows our previous results of Table 5, column 
8. Column 2 includes the GDP volatility for a 2-year rollover window. In this case, 
we find that the GDP volatility is positive but not significant. Again, our previous 
results stay robust with the inclusion of GDP volatility: i) spreads of the EMU 
countries tend to be lower; ii) there is a negative relationship between spreads and 
fiscal balance, which is weaker if the country is part of the EMU area; and iii) there is 
a negative relationship between GDP and spreads, which weakens if the country is 
part of the EMU area. Finally, there is a positive and increasing relationship between 
spreads and public debt but, if the country is a member of the EMU area, spreads tend 
to be less sensitive to large levels of debt. 
Figures 8 and 9 show the result of the variance test with the inclusion of GDP 
volatility, using random effects and difference-in-difference methods, respectively. 
As before, we find that the variance of spreads for EMU countries is significantly 












Table 7: With GDP Volatility II 
Difference in Difference Approach 




Public Debt (1) -1.8121 -1.7288
[1.1886] [1.2686]
Pub. Debt*Eurozone 10.6779*** 10.2591***
[1.5340] [1.3397]
Square Public Debt (1) 2.3214*** 2.3484***
[0.5684] [0.5408]
Sq. Pub. Debt*Eurozone -5.2004*** -5.4868***
[0.9177] [0.8329]
Fiscal Balance (1) -5.7166* -5.2740*
[2.9246] [2.9427]
Fiscal Bal.*Eurozone 10.3627** 8.6257*
[4.0465] [4.3183]








Nat Stock Market Index -0.4987*** -0.5366***
[0.1642] [0.1620]
Financial Int. (Lane-Milesi) -0.0412 -0.0552
[0.0590] [0.0610]
GDP Volatility





Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes
No. Obs 2414 2387
No. Countries 30 30
R2 overall 0.7584 0.7637  
Controlled by international reserves, inflation rate, VIX index, US FED interest Rate, Exchange Rate 
Regime, Asian, Russian and Argentine Crises Dummies. 
(1) As % of GDP. (2) Annual growth rate 




      Figure 8: Variance Test Random Effects, with GDP Volatility 
 
               Figure 9: Variance Test Difference-in-Difference, with GDP Volatility 
 





The 2008-2013 debt crisis in the EMU zone has been characterized by an 
unprecedented increase and differentiation of sovereign bond spreads of EMU 
countries. This behavior has been associated with the financial markets' concerns 
about the fiscal positions (i.e., large public debts and fiscal deficits) of several EMU 
members, in particular Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and Spain. 
This behavior contrasts with the EMU spreads' performance before the crisis, 
when they were low and close together. Even though several EMU countries had 
exhibited weak fiscal positions years before the onset of the crisis, it is puzzling why 
pre-crisis spreads do not seem to reflect those deteriorating positions before 2008. 
In this chapter, we study the behavior of sovereign bond spreads of EMU 
countries before the 2008-2013 debt crisis. In particular, we test whether pre-crisis 
spreads exhibit three features that the literature has related to the existence of 
creditors' expectations of bailouts in case of an economic crisis: i) a lower spread 
level, ii) a weak relationship with macroeconomic fundamentals, and iii) a lower 
cross-sectional variance among bond spreads from different economies.  
Using econometric methods such as panel data with random effects, mixed 
effects models, and the difference-in-difference approach, we find that: first, EMU 
member countries have, on average, lower spreads than countries outside this area; 
second, spreads of EMU countries are less correlated with country-specific 
fundamentals such as fiscal balance and the GDP growth rate, and spreads are less 
sensitive to larger levels of public debt when the country is a EMU member; and 




variance of non-EMU spreads between 1999 and end-2005. Our results are valid after 
controlling for country fundamental indicators (including GDP volatility) and global 
market conditions, and remain robust when we additionally control for indicators that 
capture alternative explanations of the sovereign spreads' behavior such as currency 
risk, liquidity (size) of the bond market, financial integration, and the general demand 
for financial assets from those countries (an "exuberance" effect). 
Overall, our results suggest that institutional arrangements like the EMU area 
have effects on investors' valuation of sovereign risk. Without excluding alternative 
explanations for the behavior of pre-crisis sovereign spreads that the literature has 
suggested (i.e., elimination of currency risk, larger financial liberalization and 
integration, larger liquidity on the EMU's sovereign bond market, and the 
"exuberance" effect), these findings are consistent with the existence of creditor 
moral hazard in the EMU's sovereign bond market. In other words, our results suggest 
that holders of sovereign bonds of EMU countries behaved recklessly before the 
2008-2013 crisis in the sense that they had less incentives to rigorously monitor 
country-specific fundamentals of EMU countries when pricing their bonds. 
Consequently, they did not discriminate among EMU countries with respect to credit 
risk associated with their fundamentals, indicating lack of "market discipline". 
In terms of future research, we think it would be helpful to create a theoretical 
model that explains how the economic integration and the institutional structure of the 
EMU area generate implicit guarantees among EMU countries, in order to better 
understand how creditors' expectations of bailout are created. For this, it is important 




countries and the determinants of the subsequent banks' exposure to those countries.










Since late 2009, financial markets have been occupied with developments 
concerning the sovereign debt of Peripheral Euro Countries (Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
Portugal, and Spain, or PEC).
42
 Events have led to a significant widening of bond 
yield spreads and higher risk premium on credit default swaps of PEC. And policy 
makers and financial markets have been concerned about the spillovers to other 
Eurozone countries through various channels that are affecting the viability of the 
Euro more generally.  
European countries and international organizations have since early 2010 
responded with a number of coordinated measures. Important region-wide steps were 
taken on May 10, 2010, when Europe's Finance Ministers approved a comprehensive 
rescue package worth €750 billion aimed at ensuring financial stability across Europe, 
including by creating the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF). This boosted 
stock market indexes for periphery and core Eurozone countries by 10% and 8% 
respectively.  
Differences among policy makers from various EU-countries as regards 
objectives and approaches have arisen, however, making markets question at times 
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 One can date the start of the Euro crisis as October 16, 2009, when incoming Greek Prime Minister 
George Papandreou told parliament “We have large hidden debts and spending,” with the previous 





the overall strategy. In June 2011, the crisis became even more intense with many 
concerns regarding the refinancing of Greek sovereign debt. As political 
disagreements surfaced, market concerns peaked again. Coordinated steps aimed to 
resolve the crisis were subsequently taken by the Eurozone countries. An important 
date was July 21, 2011, when the Euro area governments agreed on the terms for the 
second bail-out loan to Greece. Moreover, on October 27, 2011, the EU forged 
agreement with private banks on Greece debt reduction, which positively impacted 
markets. 
The varying reactions of financial markets to these events and policy 
measures announced at them have made clear that there remain many questions on 
the best way to intervene in what has been a unique financial and sovereign crisis. 
This chapter aims to shed light on the best policy mix by analyzing through what 
channels the Euro crisis spilled over to the real sectors of various countries and how 
effective policies announced were in mitigating (or not) spillovers. In theory, crises 
may spillover to firms through at least two channels: a financial channel and a trade 
channel. The financial channel arises as banks in creditor countries exposed to 
sovereign risk, directly and indirectly, see their balance sheets impaired and have to 
cut back on lending (“deleverage”) or, more generally, become reluctant to lend to 
(local) firms in the face of uncertainty. This in turn will hurt the performance of 
firms, especially those dependent on (bank) financing. The trade channel arises as 
affected countries reduce imports, which in turn implies lower firm sales and 




Policy measures can mitigate these channels, but are likely to vary in their 
effectiveness. Public financial support for affected countries can help creditor banks 
as their asset values are enhanced, and thereby help banks to maintain financing to 
domestic firms. Support can also boost demand in affected countries, thus help to 
maintain their imports, and thereby the exports of firms. Our objective is to 
investigate through which of these two channels and to what degree the various 
policy measures have affected firms. This will allow for an assessment as to the 
efficacy of specific support measures. We also study two groups of firms: firms from 
around the world, and EU firms. Studying the first group informs us about the general 
channels of cross-border contagion. Studying the second group provides, beside a 
robustness test, insight on whether the measures helped to stabilize economic and 
financial conditions within the EU and the Eurozone. 
Empirical work on the real impacts of the Euro crisis has been limited to date, 
in large part as the crisis is still evolving. There is, however, a literature that studies 
the global transmission of the (earlier) U.S. subprime crisis, which, although the 
evidence from studies is mixed, offers some lessons and methodological guidance. 
Some studies find that pre-crisis financial integration affected how the crisis impacted 
individual countries (e.g., Claessens et al., 2010; Milesi-Ferretti and Tille, 2011; 
Cetorelli and Goldberg, 2012; and Forbes, 2012). In contrast, Rose and Spiegel 
(2010, 2012) fail to find roles for country factors, including trade and financial 
linkages, in how countries were affected. A common feature of these studies, 




factors and individual contagion channels is thus perhaps no surprise since the macro 
data reflect the aggregation of multiple underlying factors.  
To separate the various channels, one could go to firm-level, micro data and 
use actual financial statements (see Forbes, 2004, 2012; and Claessens, Tong, and 
Wei, 2012).
43
 For the current Euro crisis, however, firm-level evidence is limited, 
mainly because firm-level performance data on indicators such as profitability are 
released at low frequency with a long lag. Moreover, individual bank-level data on 
indicators such as exposure to affected countries are often missing, making analysis 
of specific channels difficult. And details on how policy measures are implemented 
are often lacking. The lack of suitable data in turn prevents the examination of actual 
responses of firms to the crisis and specific policy measures. 
We overcome the lack of actual firm and bank data and policy measures by 
using firm-level stock price data and key event dates at which policy changes were 
announced, as well as benchmark characteristics of firms. Since stock prices are 
forward-looking, they can be expected to reflect the markets’ reactions as to how 
firms may be affected by policies announced. And the benchmark characteristics 
allow one to trace the channels through which firms are affected. This approach has 
been used in similar ways to address these types of questions, as in Tong and Wei 
(2011), which examined the cross-country impact of the US subprime crisis.
44
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 Forbes (2004) studies how the 1997-98 Asian and Russian crises spread to other markets and Forbes 
(2012) analyze how the current Euro crisis spread. Claessens, Tong, and Wei (2012) examine how the 
2007-2009 crisis affected firm performance and how various linkages propagated shocks across 
borders, by using accounting data for 7722 non-financial firms in 42 countries. There has been more 
analysis of the drivers of the recent trade retrenchment in 2008-2009, also using firm or sector level 
data (e.g., Alessandria et al., 2010; Behrens et al., 2010; Bems et al., 2010; Levchenko et al., 2010). 
And Duchin, Ozbas and Sensoy (2010) examine quarterly US investment from Q3, 2007 to Q3, 2008. 
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 They show evidence of liquidity crunches across emerging market economies by reporting that stock 




We focus our analysis on four key events during the Euro crisis and related 
financial market responses, three with positive news and one with negative news. The 
first event is May 10, 2010, when the European Financial Stability Facility was 
established. This event was widely regarded as positive, with general, albeit not 
uniform increases in stock prices and an appreciation of the Euro.
45
 The second, 
negative news event is from June 8 to 10, 2011, when there appeared to be public 
disagreements among core Eurozone countries on private sector participation in the 
resolution for Greek crisis, which created much turbulence in global financial 
markets.
46
 The third event is July 19-21, 2011, when leaders of the Euro zone 
announced the terms of the second bail-out loan to Greece of €109 billion and the 
voluntary participation of private creditors. This agreement was welcomed by 
markets, in part because it eliminated some of the uncertainty generated by the 
contrasting public positions of the German government and the ECB about private 
participation in the program.
47
 The fourth event is Oct 25-27, 2011, when the EU 
forged the Greek bond deal involving a fifty percent haircut, a resolution also viewed 
favorably by financial markets. 
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 Stock market indexes for periphery and core Eurozone countries increased by 10% and 8% 
respectively, while the Euro appreciated on May 10, 2010 by 2% against the dollar. 
46
 On June 8, 2011, German Finance Minister Schäuble called for a Greek debt rollover into 7-year 
maturities. But on June 10, ECB President Trichet ruled out ECB participation in any debt rollover 
constituting default. Analysts noted the entrenched stand-off, and were unsure about the Greece crisis 
resolution. From June 7 to 10, the stock market indexes for periphery and core Eurozone countries 
decreased by 2.3% and 1.3% respectively, while the Euro depreciated by 2.2%. 
47
 We use as the event window July 19 to 21, 2011, as the agreement became partially known before 
the announcement in the evening of July 21 (e.g., at about 2pm on July 21, the draft agreement was 
already published by the Telegraph). Capital markets partially anticipated the agreement starting July 
19 due to two pieces of news: i) a comment of Mr. Ewald Nowotny, governor of the Austria’s Central 
Bank, that a short-term selective default situation would not have major negative consequences, 
appearing to signal a softening of the ECB position about default scenario; and ii) reports on July 20 
that Eurozone policymakers requested a delay of the Eurozone Summit in order to agree on private 




We examine whether and how the policy measures (or reversal thereof) at 
these key event dates affected firm-level stock returns in the Eurozone and other 
countries. We do this for 3045 firms in 16 countries. For the positive news events, 
when policy measures were adopted, (the first, third and fourth events), we find that 
stock prices particularly increased for more financially–constrained firms and in 
countries where banks had large pre-crisis claims on peripheral Eurozone countries. 
Trade linkages with peripheral countries played a minor role, although Euro exchange 
rate movements led to some differential effects in some cases. For the negative news 
event, when some policy measures were reversed (the second event), we find effects 
similar to those of May 10, 2010, but with opposite signs: financially-constrained 
firms in countries with more exposed banks suffered more as did firms in sectors that 
exported more to peripheral countries.  
These results are very robust. They carry through when we perform weighted 
regressions, to control for differences in sample size across countries, and when we 
analyze abnormal stock returns. The financial channel becomes even stronger when 
we focus on firms from the EU only, consistent with EU policy makers being mostly 
focused on assisting their firms. And the results carry through when we include 
various control variables, such as proxies for demand channels and movements in 
countries’ sovereign CDS spreads. Moreover, results are preserved when we use bank 
exposure to public sectors in Greece, Ireland and Portugal only (rather than exposures 
to all sectors), suggesting that sovereign risks importantly drove financial spillovers 




Collectively, our findings confirm that the European sovereign debt crisis 
spilled over to the real economy in other countries mostly through financial channels 
and only somewhat through trade channels, and more so for EU firms. And they show 
that policy measures at various dates mainly helped (or failed) to support creditor 
banks and mitigate the adverse effects on domestic financing conditions in core 
countries. These results show that policy makers considered reducing cross-border 
financial spillovers among closely-integrated countries the most important to preserve 
the benefits from integrated financial markets and a single currency.  
Our analysis relates to studies on pre-crisis Eurozone integration since it 
highlights the possible costs of and risks in a unified currency zone during periods of 
financial stress. Some of these studies focus on how a common currency influences 
financial integration (e.g., Frankel and Rose, 2002; Codogno et al., 2003; Manganelli 
and Wolswijk, 2004; and Sgherri and Zoli, 2009). These papers document how 
sovereign bond spreads converged among Euro countries between 1999 and 2008, 
with the decline in spreads associated with increased international market liquidity 
and risk diversification, but little with country-specific factors, such as public debt. 
On the channels of integration, Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2010) find that the Euro’s 
impact on financial integration is mainly through the elimination of currency risk, but 
not through trade. Bris, Koskinen and Nilsson (2009) find that the Euro increased 
corporate valuation more for firms from Euro countries with less credibility in their 
previous exchange rate policy.
48
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 Mainly countries that devalued during the Exchange Rate Mechanism crisis of 1992/93: Finland, 




 Our study also relates to the literature on links between sovereign and private 
borrowings. Earlier studies documented negative “spillover” effects of sovereign 
credit risk on firms’ access to international capital markets, mainly for emerging 
markets (e.g., Ferri et al., 2001; Borensztein et al., 2007; and Arteta and Hale, 
2008).
49
 So far, this literature has focused largely on the effects of government’s 
actions on corporations in their own country. Our study shows that sovereign crises 
can also affect foreign firms with financial and trade linkages with the countries in 
crises, and shows the specific role of a currency union.  
Our work further relates to the growing literature on the Euro crisis. Early 
studies of the Euro crisis focused on how risk evolved in the banking sector and 
spilled onto sovereigns (Eichengreen et al., 2009; and Mody 2009). More recently, 
Horvath and Huizinga (2011) perform an event study of the May 2011 EFSF 
announcement. Their focus, however, is on the effects on banks’ share prices and 
CDS spreads and on sovereign CDS spreads, and whether the EFSF benefitted banks 
or PEC-sovereigns. And Popov and Van Horen (2012) examine how syndicated 
lending by European banks varies with balance sheet exposure to PEC sovereign 
debt. In this analysis, we focus instead on the channels through which sovereign risk 
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In this literature, the main channels through which governments may transmit credit risks to the 
private sector are: reduced public spending, increases in taxes, and capital controls. These government 
actions can affect firms’ expected returns, reduce their collateral value, and increase firm-level 
borrowing costs. 
50
 Related work on cross-border banking spillovers but using aggregate data is Kaminsky and Reinhart 
(2003), who studied how a common lender propagated problems across multiple countries during the 




Finally, our study relates to the recent literature on crisis contagion through 
equity markets. For instance, Bekaert et al. (2011) analyze the transmission of the 
2007-2009 financial crisis by examining country-industry equity portfolios in 55 
countries.
51
 They did not study the Euro crisis, however, which started only in 2010. 
We also explore higher-frequency (daily) movements at the firm level, which allows 
us to more directly identify the effects of policy announcements.  
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows. We describe our data and 
methodology in Section 2. Section 3 presents results for the four key events during 
the Euro crisis. Section 4 reports results for robustness check of our main results. 
Section 5 then concludes.  
 
The Framework and Data 
Building on the existing literature, we aim to distinguish, by using firm-level 
stock price data, the transmission channels through which the crisis in peripheral Euro 
countries spilled over to the rest of the world. We examine two channels through 
which the crisis may have spilled over: a financial channel and a trade channel. We 
employ a consistent framework to distinguish the impacts of these two channels. To 
isolate transmission through the finance channel, we make use of the following idea: 
if the availability of credit plays an important role for firm performance, a shock to 
the supply of external financing should be reflected in the performance of those firms 
that rely more on external finance (for investment) relative to those firms that rely 
less on external financing. Similarly, if trade were to be an important factor, a shock 
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to demand leading to a change in imports should be reflected in the performance of 
those firms that rely more heavily on exports to peripheral Euro countries relative to 
those firms that rely less on such exports. And markets should reflect performance 
differences in firms’ stock prices whenever there is news (positive or negative) about 
the supply of external financing or trade prospects. 
Basic Specification 
The basic empirical strategy is to check whether ex ante classifications of 
firms in terms of their intrinsic characteristics – degree of financial dependence and 
exposure to trade - help to explain changes in their stock price performance following 
key events in the European sovereign debt crisis. To proxy the intrinsic financial 
dependence, we use the approach of relying on the sector characteristics of U.S. 
firms, which are arguably exogenous to our sample of firms (see Rajan and Zingales, 
1998; note that we do not include U.S. firms in our regressions). And for trade 
linkage, we use pre-crisis actual trade exposures at the country-sector level. 
Specifically, our empirical model is given by the following equation:  
       (18) 
where i stands for company, j for sector, and k for country. Note that this is a pure 
cross-sectional regression for each key event in the European sovereign crisis and that 
the key regressors are pre-determined (in 2006). We add firm size (log assets in US 
dollar) as our base control variable. 
We start by assuming the same β and λ for all countries in order to estimate 




pattern of pre-crisis financial exposure to peripheral Euro countries affects the extent 
of a liquidity crunch, we consider the interaction between a country’s financial 
exposure and its firms’ dependence on external finance. In other words,  
                                 (19) 
where Financial Exposurek is country k’s banking sector exposure to peripheral Euro 
countries. The slope coefficient, β2, then captures the extent to which financial 
exposure affects the severity of the external-financing supply shock. 
Related to the trade channel, we include an interaction term of trade linkage 
with the Euro dummy. That is,  
                                          (20) 
The slope coefficient, λ2, then captures the extent to which the severity of the 
trade shock depends on Eurozone membership.  
Event Selection 
There certainly have been many events related to European sovereign crisis 
between October 2009 (the start of the Euro sovereign debt crisis) and December 
2011. Of these, we choose in the following way four key events to examine the 
spillover channels. We started with examining the three-day change in the five-year 
Greek sovereign CDS spread.  (We find similar patterns when we examine the change 
in the average sovereign CDS spread of PEC.) As seen in Figure 10, over the period 
from October 2009 to December 2011, the three largest drops in the spread occurred 
on May 10, 2010, July 21, 2011, and October 27, 2011. Hence we selected these three 
positive news events. As for the second event (June 8-10, 2011), the sovereign CDS 




after a relatively low volatility period from July 2010 to May 2011.
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 The second 
event can thus been seen as a major negative event. Figure 11 plots the five-year 
Greek CDS spread (in levels) for narrower windows around each of the four events. It 
shows again the large movements in financial markets at the time of these events.  
For these four events, we further confirm that they satisfy the following 
criteria: i) news of the event was on the front page of the Financial Times and the 
Wall Street Journal; ii) the event was the major news item during the time-window 
(i.e., no other major news from world markets occurred during or just before that 
period); and iii) the event was not much anticipated (for instance, there was no major 
leakage of the news in the media related to the event’s timing or magnitude). Also, as 
there was little prior change in the Greek sovereign CDS spread, we are confident that 
these four events were not fully anticipated by the market.  
Key Data 
We describe here the definitions of our dependent variable, the change in 
stock price, and the two sectorial benchmark indicators for external financing and 
trade sensitivity. We also discuss data used to measure the linkages of countries with 
peripheral Euro countries. 
Percentage change in stock price. The stock price index is from Datastream 
and is the total rate of return index, i.e., adjusted for dividends, and action such as 
stock splits and reverse splits.  
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 Similar results are found if a one-day or a two-day change in the average sovereign CDS spread is 
calculated. Note also that we do not test whether events related to the European sovereign crisis affect 
the sovereign CDS spread of Greece. Rather we examine how these events may affect firms in other 




































































































































Financial dependence index. We construct a sector-level proxy of a firm’s 
intrinsic dependence on external finance for investment following a methodology of 
Rajan and Zingales (1998): 
               (21) 
where cash flow = cash flow from operations + decreases in inventories + decreases 
in receivables + increases in payables. All the numbers are based on U.S. firms, 
which are judged to be least likely to suffer from financing constraints (during normal 
times) relative to firms in other countries. While the original Rajan and Zingales 
(1998) paper covers only 40 (mainly 2-digit SIC) sectors, we expand the coverage to 
around 110 3-digit SIC sectors.  
To calculate this benchmark, we take the following steps. First, every firm in 
the COMPUSTAT USA is sorted into one of the 3-digit SIC sectors. Second, we 
calculate the ratio of actual dependence on external finance for each firm from 1990-
2006. Third, we calculate the sector-level median from firm ratios for each 3-digit 
SIC sector that contains at least 5 firms. The median value is then chosen to be the 
index of demand for external financing in that sector. Conceptually, the Rajan-
Zingales index aims to identify sector-level features, i.e., which sectors are naturally 
more dependent on external financing for their business operation. The index could 
be seen as a “technical feature” of a sector, almost like a part of the production 
function. It does not consider which firms are more or less liquidity constrained 





Trade Exposure. Trade exposure captures a country’s exports to peripheral 
Euro countries (Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Italy and Spain). To construct this variable, 
we use data on bilateral exports at the 4-digit SIC sector-level for year 2006. Then 
trade exposure is defined as: 
   (22) 
for exports of sector j in country k to country group cg (Peripheral Euro Countries). 
Data for 2006 are retrieved from the United Nations Commodity Trade Statistics 
Database (UN Comtrade).  
 
Bank Lending Exposure. Banking lending exposure captures the pre-crisis linkage of 
country k with peripheral Euro countries through credit exposure. To construct this 
variable, we use information on the “consolidated foreign claims by nationality of 
reporting banks, immediate borrower basis”, as published by the Bank of 
International Settlements (BIS), for the fourth quarter of 2006. We then calculate a 
creditor country’s relative banking system exposure as: 
          (23) 
where k is a creditor country and cg is the debtor country group of interest, such as 
peripheral Euro countries. We use a relative measure to account for the fact that some 
countries are more active in international lending. Our sample includes a total of 16 





Control Variables. As noted, we include variables to control for basic firm 
characteristics. One is firm size, measured by the log of book assets in US dollars. 
Note that size may also proxy for the degree to which the firm is active 





With this framework and data, we aim to test the following three hypotheses: 
H1: News about the Euro crisis will change the stock returns of financially-
dependent firms more. That is, β >0 when there is positive, and β <0 when there is 
negative news. 
H2: News about the Euro crisis will change the stock returns of financially-
dependent firms more in countries with larger bank exposure to peripheral Euro 
countries. That is, β2>0 when there is positive, and β2<0 when there is negative news. 
H3: News about the Euro crisis will affect the stock returns more of firms 
with more trade exposure to peripheral Euro countries. That is, 1 >0 when there is 
positive, and 1 <0 when there is negative news.  
H4: News about the Euro crisis will affect the stock returns of firms from 
Eurozone countries with trade exposure to peripheral Euro countries differently of 
firms from non-Eurozone countries. Specifically, if the bailout helps stabilize the 
crisis, it may cause the Euro to appreciate and consequently reduce the 
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 We also included a proxy for demand sensitivity as an additional control variable to capture a firm’s 
relative sensitivity to a contraction in aggregate consumer demand. However, this variable is always 




competitiveness of Euro-area exporting firms. This would mean that 2 <0 when there 
is positive news and 2 >0 when there is negative news.  
 
Basic Statistics 
Table 8 shows the number of non-financial firms included in the sample, 
classified by country of origin. Our sample includes 3045 firms from 16 advanced 




Table 8: Number of Listed Firms 
Country # of firms Country # of firms
Australia 182 Germany 236
Austria 29 Japan 1296
Belgium 43 Mexico 22
Brazil 63 Netherlands 50
Canada 283 Sweden 120
Chile 13 Switzerland 93
Denmark 43 Turkey 68
France 169 United Kingdom 335
TOTAL 3045  
Source: Worldscope. 
 
Table 9 reports summary statistics for our key dependent and explanatory 
variables. The statistics show that, on average, the stock prices of individual firms 
increase at the announcements of the €750 billion bail-out fund for countries in crisis 
(May 10, 2010), the second bail-out for Greece (July 19-21, 2011), and the new terms 
for the second bail-out for Greece (October 25-27, 2011). In contrast, firms’ stock 
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prices dropped in general when there was public disagreement among core Euro 
countries on private sector participation in Greek assistance (June 8-10, 2011). Table 
2 also shows the heterogeneous response of prices to those events: the change in 
prices ranges in May 2010 between -13.3 to 13.7 percent; June 2011 -15.6 to 17.19 
percent; July 2011 -13.7 to 17.2 percent, and October 2011 -15.4 to 18.8 percent. 
Table 9 also shows some of the heterogeneity in the firms we study, with large 
variations in size. For example, the firm at the 75
th
 percentage is eight times larger 
than that at the 25
th
 percentile. There is also much variation in our sectorial and 
country variables. For example, external financing sensitivity varies between 0 and 1, 
with a standard deviation of 0.32. Trade exposure to peripheral Euro countries varies 
between 0 and 0.96 across sector-country pairs, with a standard deviation of 0.1. 
Banking exposure to peripheral Euro countries varies between 0.01 and 0.20 across 
creditor countries, with a standard deviation of 0.05. This makes these variables good 
indicators to identify the channels by which the firm-specific responses in stock 
prices may arise. 
 
Empirical Results 
We first examine how various firm and sector features affect changes in firm’s 
stock price around the announcement of the €750 billion bail-out fund (May 10, 
2010). We present our basic regression results in Table 10, which cluster standard 
errors at the US SIC 3-digit sector.
55
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 R-squared values in our estimations are generally low. However, this is typical for event studies as it 























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































In Column 1, we show that the coefficient on external financial dependence is 
positive, albeit insignificant. This means that the event had more impact on firms 
from industries with higher financing needs for capital expenditures. This suggests 
that the announcement led banks to more willingly supply external financing to local 
firms as they had less concerns about their balance sheets. We find strong evidence 
that the impact of the event is more pronounced for large firms and firms with larger 
trade exposure to peripheral Euro countries. This suggests that the announcement of 
the bail-out fund implied improved expectations about the pace of the recovery of 
aggregate demand in those countries. Therefore, large firms and firms from countries 
and sectors that have larger trade linkages to peripheral Euro countries stood to 
benefit more, reflected in a large increase of their stock prices.  
To evaluate the importance of the cross-border financial channel, we add the 
interaction of the financial dependence index with country bank exposure in Column 
2. We find this interaction to be positive and significant. That is, the stock returns are 
higher for firms with higher natural external financial dependence located in countries 
whose banking systems are more exposed to peripheral Euro countries. This suggests 
that, as the creation of the €750 billion bail-out fund was expected to enhance the 
value of claims on the peripheral countries, banks’ balance sheets were strengthened, 
which in turn allowed banks to more easily finance firms.  
In Column 3, we explore further the importance of trade as a transmission 
channel. We include in our regression a dummy variable “Euro dummy” which 
equals 1 if the country is part of the Eurozone and zero otherwise. In addition, we 




expect differences between Euro and non-Eurozone countries in the importance of 
trade for two reasons. On the one hand, Euro countries are more closely integrated 
with peripheral Euro countries through trade and financial linkages and these firms 
and their stock prices could thus be expected to gain more at the time of the event. On 
the other hand, since the Euro appreciated around the time of the event, Euro firms 
could be expected to experience lower stock price movements as they did lose 
competitiveness at the same time.  
We find the coefficient on the Euro dummy to be positive and significant, 
suggesting that markets expected the policy measures to improve economic prospects 
in the Eurozone. However, the coefficient on the interaction between the Euro 
dummy and the country’s trade exposure is significantly negative. That is, stock 
prices of Eurozone firms with trade exposure to peripheral Euro countries increased 
less than those of non-Eurozone firms with similar trade exposure (the overall effect 
for Eurozone firms is actually about zero, 6.6 - 6.51). This could be due to the adverse 
effect of the concurrent Euro appreciation. So, while the policy measures benefited 
firms from say both Japan and France that export to peripheral Euro countries, as 
reflected by the positive coefficient of trade exposure, because of the simultaneous 
appreciation of the Euro, this event benefitted Japanese exporters more than French 
exporters.  
In Columns 4, 5 and 6, we include sector fixed effects, country fixed effects, 
and both sector and country fixed effects, respectively, in order to control for 
unobserved characteristics at industry and country levels (but then we drop the 




financial channel remains statistically very significant: firms from industries with 
higher external financial dependence in countries whose banking system is more 
exposed to peripheral Euro countries tend to have larger stock price increases in 
response to the event. With respect to the trade channel, we find the coefficient of the 
Euro dummy to be positive and significant and the coefficient of the interaction 
between this dummy and trade exposure to be negative (although, perhaps not 
surprising, it becomes insignificant when country fixed effects are included). This 
result suggests that the Euro-appreciation effect becomes less important after 
controlling for country characteristics. 
Based on the results in Column 6, the stock return of a firm from the 
“Manufacturing of Medical and Surgical instruments” sector (with financial 
dependence at the 75
th
 percentile) in the United Kingdom (with bank exposure at the 
75
th
 percentile) was 0.22 percent higher than that of a firm from the “Pulp, Paper, and 
Paperboard Mills” sector (with financial dependence at the 25
th
 percentile) in Canada 
(with bank exposure at the 25
th
 percentile). The difference (0.22 percent) is large 
compared to the average increase in stock prices (2.26 percent). In contrast, the trade 
channel is neither statistically or economically significant. 
In Table 11, we report the results of our estimations for the second event: 
public disagreement among core Eurozone countries on the resolution for Greek crisis 
(June 8-10, 2011), which was generally perceived negatively by markets. In Column 
1, we find a negative and significant coefficient for external financial dependence, 




more vulnerable to these kinds of negative events, and therefore show larger drops in 
their stock prices.  
In Column 2, we add the interaction between financial dependence and bank 
exposure to peripheral Euro countries. Again, the drop in stock prices is more 
pronounced for firms from industries with greater financial dependence, particularly 
in countries whose banking systems are more exposed to those countries. This 
suggests that these events led to concerns about the ability of banks in creditor 
countries to continue to finance firms, especially those with greater external financing 
needs. In addition, trade exposure is negative and significant in Column 2. That is, 
firms from countries and sectors with larger trade linkages to peripheral Euro 
countries were thought to be more vulnerable, with their stock prices falling more.  
In Column 3, we examine further the trade channel by including an interaction 
between the Euro dummy and trade exposure. The coefficient for the Euro dummy is 
significantly negative (-3.63), as is the coefficient of trade exposure (-5.08). The 
coefficient for the interaction term is significantly positive (6.59), probably because 
the Euro depreciation at the same time improved the competitiveness of firms from 
the Eurozone over other firms.
56
 Consequently, markets expected higher profits for 
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 The overall effect of trade exposure is positive but insignificant for Eurozone firms (i.e., 1.51 = -

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































In Columns 4, 5, and 6 we include sector, country and both sector and country 
fixed effects, respectively, to control for unobserved characteristics at country and 
industry levels. In all specifications, we find the financial channel to be important in 
explaining the behavior of stock prices around the event, with coefficients all 
negative and significant. In addition, and different from the results in Table 10, trade 
exposure is negative and significant in all three specifications, and the coefficient on 
the interaction of trade exposure and Euro dummy is positive and significant. The 
main message is that both financial and trade channels for transmitted shocks from 
peripheral Euro countries to the real sectors of other economies.  
Based on Column 6 of Table 11, the stock price of a firm from the 
“Manufacturing of Medical and Surgical Instruments” sector (with financial 
dependence at the 75th percentile) in the United Kingdom (with bank exposure at the 
75th percentile) falls 0.27 percent more than that of a firm from the “Pulp, Paper, and 
Paperboard Mills” sector (with dependence at the 25th percentile) in Canada (with 
bank exposure at the 25th percentile). This difference (0.27 percent) is again large 
compared with the average fall in stock prices (0.43 percent).  
For non-Euro firms, the economic impact of the trade channel is similar to that 
of the financial channel. Based on Column 6, the stock price of a firm from the 
“Manufacturing of Equipment for Construction” sector in Switzerland (trade 
exposure at the 75th percentile of 9.9 percent) was 0.34 percent lower than that of a 
firm from the “Rolling, Drawing, and Extruding Nonferrous Metals” sector in 
Australia (trade exposure at the 25th percentile of 0.6 percent). For firms from the 




(actually it switches sign). For example, the stock return of a firm from the 
“Production of Electronic Components” sector in the Netherlands (trade exposure of 
18.5 percent at the 75th percentile among Euro countries) was only 0.08 percent higher 
than that of a firm from the “Production of Industrial Inorganic Chemicals” sector in 
Belgium (trade exposure of 8.4 percent at the 25th percentile among Euro countries). 
In Table 12, we report the results of our estimations for the third event, the 
approval of the second bail-out package for Greece (July 19-21, 2011), which was 
generally perceived positively by financial markets. Similar to the first event (the 
creation of the €750-billion bail-out fund), we find positive effects for the financial 
channel in all specifications, and they remain significant when we include country 
and sector fixed effects. With respect to the trade channel, we find a positive and 
significant coefficient for the Euro dummy, suggesting that capital markets expected 
this decision to improve economic prospects of the Euro area especially. However, 
the interaction term between trade exposure and the Euro dummy is insignificant, 



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































In Table 13, we report the results for the October 25-27, 2011 event. We use a 
3-day window, from the closing of Oct 24 to the closing of Oct 27, to take into 
account potential leakage of news before the announcement the night of Oct 26.
57
 
Similar to the first and third events, we find positive effects for the financial channel 
in all specifications, which also remain significant when we include country and 
sector fixed effects. With respect to the trade channel, we find no consistent result for 
trade exposure to periphery European countries, suggesting that, for this event, the 
trade channel was not a key transmission mechanism. 
 
Robustness Checks 
In this section, we conduct some robustness checks, including examining an 
EU-only sample, abnormal stock returns and performing weighted regressions. In 
addition, we revisit our main results taking into account financial and trade exposure 
to only Greece, Ireland and Portugal, and evaluating the financial channel using 
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 Between October 25 and 26, there was some speculation about the participation of private creditors 
in write-offs and the level of the EFSF. Since the announcement was at the night of Oct 26, the 










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































European Union Sample 
In Table 14, we repeat the analyses of Tables 10 to 13, but focus on firms 
from the EU, as these firms can be expected to be more affected by the events, both 
as they have closer financial and trade links with the affected countries and as support 
may disproportionally help their own banking systems.
58
 We report specifications that 
include both country and sector fixed effects. Columns 1 to 4 report the results for the 
four respective events.  
 For the 1
st
 event, the interaction between financial dependence and bank 
exposure is positive and significant. Particularly, the stock return of an European firm 
from the “Manufacturing of Medical and Surgical instruments” sector (financial 
dependence at the 75th percentile) in Germany (bank exposure at the 75th percentile 
among the Eurozone) is 0.66 percent larger than that of a firm from the “Pulp, Paper, 
and Paperboard Mills” sector (dependence at the 25th percentile) in Austria (bank 
exposure at the 25th percentile). The difference (0.66 percent) is large compared to 
the average increase in the Eurozone (3.4 percent). 
Column 2 reports the results for the 2
nd
 event. In general, it confirms the 
financial channel to be the main transmission channel of shocks from PEC to the rest 
of the EU: stock prices fall more for financially-constrained firms, especially in 
countries whose banking system is more exposed to PEC. In Column 3 and 4, we 




 events. Again the interaction term between the 
financial dependence index and the country’s banking system exposure is positive 
and significant.  
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 The countries included are: Austria (29 firms), Belgium (43 firms), Denmark (43 firms), France (169 















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The trade channel appears to be less important in transmitting shocks from 
peripheral Euro countries to the real sectors of other EU economies, as it is never 
statistically significant. Together, results suggest that the financial channel very 
importantly transmits shocks from peripheral Euro countries to other EU countries 
and that policy measures were most effective in mitigating this channel. 
 
Abnormal Returns 
To further evaluate the robustness of results, we conduct analyses using 
abnormal returns. We construct abnormal returns employing the market model, which 
assumes a stable linear relation between market and individual stock returns, and 
define abnormal returns as: 
   (24) 
where i stands for company, j for sector, and k for country. We construct each firm’s 
Beta based on the correlation of weekly firm-level stock returns and local market 
returns. We then construct each firm’s Alpha as the average of the firm’s weekly 
average return minus the Beta multiplied by the average market return. When 
constructing abnormal returns, we use Alpha and Beta estimated for normal times 
(i.e., year 2006) to avoid any impact of the crisis on the Beta estimations. We also 
winsorize the generated abnormal returns at the 1 percent level.
59 
The results of this 
exercise are shown in Table 15. 
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 As Alpha is constructed from weekly data, we use (1/5)*Alpha in constructing abnormal stock 
returns for the first event (May 2010), and (3/5)*Alpha for the second (June 2011), third (July 2011) 




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































In Column 1 of Table 15, we report results for the first event (May 2010). We 
find the coefficient for the interaction between financial dependence and bank 
exposure to be positive and significant, confirming the importance of the financial 
channel in explaining the behavior of non-financial firms’ stock prices. In addition, 
Column 1 shows the coefficient for the interaction term between trade exposure and 
Euro dummy to be negative and significant. Similar to Table 10, this suggests that 
capital markets expected the policy measures to improve economic prospects in the 
Eurozone, but Eurozone exporting firms benefited less, possibly due to the drop in 
their relative competitiveness with respect to non-Eurozone exporting firms caused by 
the concurrent Euro appreciation. In Column 2, we examine the EU sample and again 
find financial dependence interacted with bank exposure to have a positive 
coefficient, albeit insignificant. 
In Column 3, we examine results for the second event (June 2011) using 
abnormal returns. Similar to the results of Table 11, we find the coefficient for the 
interaction between financial dependence and bank exposure to be negative and 
significant, suggesting that bank exposure is an important transmission mechanism of 
this shock to non-financial corporations around the world. In addition, we find that 
the coefficient of trade exposure is negative and significant, confirming the negative 
effect that uncertainty regarding the public positions of economic policymakers 
produced on stock capital markets’ expectations about economic prospects in the 
Eurozone. However, the interaction term between the Euro dummy and trade 
exposure is positive and significant, suggesting Eurozone exporting firms to be less 
affected by this shock, possibly as their competitiveness improved due to the 
100 
concurrent depreciation of the Euro. In short, results confirm that both financial and 
trade channels are important mechanisms for transmitting shocks from peripheral 
Euro countries to the real sectors of other economies. 
In Column 4, we reexamine the EU sample for the second event (June 2011). 
Again, financial dependence interacted with bank exposure is significantly negative. 
In Columns 5 and 6, we investigate the third event (July 2011). Again we confirm our 
previous results of Table 12. Finally, in Columns 7 and 8, we study the fourth event 
(Oct 2011). Again the earlier results in Table 13 carry through. Overall, results with 
abnormal returns strongly support our earlier findings for the general and EU sample. 
Weighted Regression 
Our sample of non-financial firms is unequally distributed across countries 
(see Table 8). To avoid our estimations to be biased due to overrepresentation of 
some countries, we next conduct estimations considering the number of firms in each 
country. Specifically, we weight by the inverse of the square root of the number of 
companies per country, which makes countries overrepresented have less influence in 
the estimations. Overall, the weighted regressions, shown in Table 16, confirm the 




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 16, Column 1 shows the results of these weighted regressions for the 
first event (May 10, 2010). As in Table 10, we find that the coefficient of the 
interaction term between financial dependence and bank exposure to peripheral Euro 
countries is positive and significant. Moreover, we find the interaction term between 
the Euro dummy and trade exposure to be negative (although it loses significance 
when controlling for country and sector fixed effects). These results thus confirm our 
previous findings for this event. Column 2 focuses on the EU sample and further 
confirms the role of financial exposure. 
Column 3 reports the results of these weighted regressions for the second 
event (June 8-10, 2011). We find similar results as in Table 11: the financial channel 
is negative and significant. This result suggests that this event produced larger stock 
price falls for companies that are more financially constrained in countries whose 
banking system is more exposed to peripheral Euro countries. Results carry through 
when we limit the analysis to the EU sample (Column 4). 
Columns 5 and 6 report the results for the third event (July 19-21, 2011). Similar to 
the results in Table 12, we find the financial channel to be the key transmission 
mechanism of this event to countries around the world and inside the EU. The results 
carry over when we examine the fourth event (Oct 25-27, 2011) in Columns 7 and 8. 
Additional Robustness Checks 
So far we have focused on the financial and trade channels. One natural 
question is whether results carry through if we also control for a demand channel. We 
therefore classify sectors as largely producing durable, semi-durable or non-durable 
goods to proxy for their sensitivity to demand. The classification follows Braun and 
103 
Larrain (2005) and Raddatz (2006) and is based on the Bureau of Economic 
Analysis’s Industry Accounts. Durable goods are assigned a 1, semi durable goods a 
0.5 and nondurable goods a 0.
60
 We then include this variable and its interaction with
bank exposure to PEC to control for the demand channel. 
 Also, we focused so far on how bank exposure to PEC affects stock prices in 
home countries. Another channel by which firms could be affected is through the 
sovereign debt in the home country, e.g., as the creditor countries assume some 
(contingent) liabilities. We hence include the change of sovereign debt credit default 
swap (CDS) spread over the event periods as an additional control variable. 
Moreover, we include its interactions with financial dependence and with durable 
goods. The specifications are otherwise similar to Table 15 (abnormal stock return for 
both the general sample and the EU sample). 
 We find (Table 17) that the durable goods variable interacted with bank 
exposure to PEC is mostly insignificant, although it is significantly positive in the 
third event for both the general and EU samples. The interaction of sovereign CDS 
spread with financial dependence is not significant for any specification. The 
interaction of sovereign CDS spread with durable goods is also insignificant for most 
specifications. These findings suggest that the four events do not affect stock prices 
through effects on home countries’ sovereign debt. Most importantly, bank exposure 
to PEC interacted with financial dependence, our key explanatory variable, remains 
significant. And in some cases, it is even larger and more significant compared to 
Table 15. 
60
 The semi-durable industries are clothing, footwear, and printing. Regression results are similar is we 























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Exposure to Greece, Ireland and Portugal 
So far, policies have largely focused on dealing with the (sovereign debt) 
problems of PEC.
61
 To evaluate the robustness of our main results, we redo our
analysis evaluating how bank and trade exposures to Greece, Ireland, and Portugal 
(GIP) only impacted the stock prices of non-financial firms. (We are interested in 
these three countries, as they actually have required assistance from the European 
Union and the International Monetary Fund). We include two variables to measure 
bank exposures to GIP: i) bank exposure to all sectors, defined as the ratio of creditor 
country banking sector’s foreign claims on GIP to its Tier-1 capital; ii) the share of 
bank exposure to GIP’s public sectors, defined as the ratio of the creditor country 
banking sector’s foreign claims on GIP’s public sectors to its overall foreign claims 
on GIP. The (confidential) data for banks’ consolidated ultimate-base foreign claims 
on GIP’s public sector come from the BIS and the data for Tier-1 capital come from 
Bankscope.
62
 Due to availability, data used for these calculations are based on Q2,
2009. 
In Table 18, we show the results for our regressions using bank exposure to 
GIP for firms in the general sample and the EU sample respectively.
63
 Column 1
(general sample) shows that for the first event, May 2010, the interaction term 
between financial dependence and bank exposure to GIP is positive and significant, 
suggesting finance to be an important transmission mechanism. Moreover, the 
61
 In particular, the four events analyzed mainly relate to actions (or lack thereof) by EU policymakers 
as regards the Greek debt crisis, but those can be considered as indicative of approaches to the 
problems of other Eurozone economies in distress, such as Ireland and Portugal, which also undergo 
EU(-IMF) programs. 
62
 See Cerutti (2013) for more details. 
63
 Due to data limitations, we drop five countries (Australia, Brazil, Chile, Mexico and Turkey), but for 
this test include Italy and Spain, which gives 13 countries.  
106 
interaction of financial dependence and the share of bank exposure to the GIP public 
sectors is positive and significant, suggesting that exposure to public sector is a key 
component behind the transmission. Note that we do not include bank overall 
exposure to GIP, bank exposure to GIP public sector or financial dependence as 
control variables, as they are already fully covered by our country and sector fixed 
effects. In Column 2, we examine the EU sample only. Reassuringly, financial 
dependence interacted with bank exposure to GIP’s public sector is again positive and 
significant, and about twice as large as in Column 1. 
Columns 3 and 4 report the results for the second event, June 2011. In 
Column 3 (general sample), we find that the interaction term between financial 
dependence and bank exposure to GIP is negative and significant. Moreover, the 
interaction of financial dependence and the share of bank exposure to GIP public 
sector is also significantly negative, i.e., firms from countries with larger bank 
exposure to GIP’s public sector display larger drops in prices. In Column 4, we focus 
on EU firms, and the interaction term between financial dependence and bank 
exposure to GIP’s public sector becomes even more pronounced. 
Columns 5 and 6 report the results for the third event, July 2011. For both 
general and EU samples, we find the interaction terms between financial dependence 
and bank exposure to GIP (All Sectors) to be positive and significant. The interaction 
terms between financial dependence and bank exposure to GIP’s public sector are still 
positive but are now insignificant. One potential explanation for the weaker effect in 
late 2011 is that while markets’ concerns focused initially on the public debts of GIP, 
107 
these concerns extended later on to these countries’ financial and private sectors, 
reducing the relative sensitiveness to GIP’s public debt. 
When we examine the fourth event, October 2011 in Columns 7 (general 































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































In this chapter, we study how the (ongoing) Euro crisis affected global 
corporate valuation, particularly for EU firms, and how policy interventions may have 
mitigated (or not) spillovers. We analyze two channels through which the crisis may 
have affected firms: a financial channel and a trade channel. To investigate the 
financial channel, we ask the question: if we classify manufacturing firms into 
different baskets based on their ex-ante sensitivity to shocks to external financing (in 
terms of investment needs), does this classification help us to explain the ex-post 
stock performance of these firms? Similarly, if we classify these firms based on their 
ex-ante exposure to trade, do firms in different groups perform differently during the 
crisis? To investigate the role of cross-border linkages, we include country-level 
financial linkages with peripheral Eurozone countries and Eurozone dummies, and 
interactions with our proxies for the financial and trade channels, into our regression 
framework.  
 We conduct our tests by examining stock price responses to four key events 
during 2010-2011 for 3045 non-financial firms from 16 countries. We find that the 
crisis had a larger impact on firms with greater ex-ante financial constraints, and 
particularly so in creditor countries more financially exposed to peripheral Euro 
countries through bank claims. Trade linkages with periphery Eurozone countries also 
played a role, but more minor, by affecting export demand, with differential effects 
across exporting firms in Euro vs. non-Euro areas, possibly because of the effects of 




On balance, we conclude that policy makers did take into account potential 
effects on both the soundness of their local banks as well trade with peripheral Euro 
countries when they planned (or reverted course on) various support measures. From 
the perspective of saving the Euro, it appears most important, at least in the eyes of 
financial markets, to address spillovers through cross-border banking exposures. 
It is important to point out, though, that this study is not meant to be a 
comprehensive assessment of the welfare effects of the Euro as a single currency or 
of the types of support measures undertaken or being considered. To do that, we need 
to evaluate not only the effects of the support measures announced on firms, but also 
the costs of the measures, such as their effects on households and others through, say, 
higher tax burdens. Furthermore, there can be differences between short and long-run 
benefits and costs of the Euro and support measures used, which would require 
analyses of both tranquil and crisis times to make a full assessment. We leave these 























BIS Bank of International Settlements 
CDS Credit Default Swap 
CIPS Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey (IMF’s database) 
ECB European Central Bank 
EFSF European Financial Stability Fund 
EMU European Monetary Union 
EU  European Union 
GIP Greece, Ireland, and Portugal 
IFS International Financial Statistics (IMF’s database) 
IMF International Monetary Fund 
PEC Peripheral Euro Countries (Ireland, Italy, Greece, Portugal, and Spain) 
SGP Stability and Growth Pact 
UN United Nations 
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